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: Revolutionary Disobedience

REVOLUTIONARY DISOBEDIENCE
Philip K. Y. Lau*
ABSTRACT
Over the past few decades, civil disobedience has become one of the most widely
studied subjects in jurisprudence. Scholars such as Rawls and Dworkin have offered
their unique reflections on the subject. Whilst many have made great contributions
to clarify its purposes and justifications,1 they have neglected one of the most
important and fundamental forms of political disobedience, namely revolutionary
disobedience. Unlike an act of civil disobedience, which recognizes governmental
authority and legitimacy,2 revolutionary disobedience explicitly denies and
challenges them. Manifested as a rupture between the constituent power
(ruled/governed) and constituted power (ruler/governor) in a given state, it is
designed to terminate the authority relationship between them, signifying a state of
exception, which deviates from the juridical norm. Contrary to traditional civil
disobedience, which reveals the unjust nature of a particular law or policy, thereby
fostering constitutional changes if the government so allows,3 in a case of
revolutionary disobedience the people directly announce their presence to oust the
government from office and even reshape the constitutional order as well as create a
new state. It is an exertion of popular sovereignty, reengaging the people in the
collective authorship of the sovereign will. Hence, an act of revolutionary
disobedience is an exercise of self-determination and is inherently democratic.
In this Article, I construct a theory of revolutionary disobedience and analyze its
correlation with the people (nation), the constitution, the state, and the democratic
boundary problem. The theory is further developed with the highlight of two political
disobedience movements: the Indian Independence Movement and the Umbrella
Movement of Hong Kong. The study exposes the limits of conventional civil
disobedience and showcases the ground-breaking role for revolutionary
disobedience for constitutional creation. Defending that Hongkongers are a people,
I suggest that they can invoke revolutionary disobedience as a direct course of action
to engage themselves in the higher law-making of the land and forfeit the authority
of the government. The final section offers a reply to the Hong Kong Bar
_________________________
*
LLM candidate at University College London (expected, 2017); LLB (Hons) University of Southampton.
Email: kwong.lau.16@ucl.ac.uk. This Article is built on its original draft written as dissertation for the LLB degree
at the University of Southampton, but has been substantially refined and expanded for its theoretical depth. First and
foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Oren Ben-Dor, without whose guidance this
Article would not be possible. I would also like to thank Professor Andrew Serdy for his helpful comments on part
of the earlier draft. Finally, I pay my tribute to Dr. Richard Flathman, whose work The Practice of Political
Authority inspired the beginning of this work.
1.
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 320 (rev. ed. 1999).
2.
See id. at 321.
3.
See id.
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Association, which has accused the last phase of the Umbrella Movement of
damaging the rule of law. I make a rebuttal to such contention and further analyze
how revolutionary disobedience is perfectly compatible with the rule of law.
“Let the fist be broken, but let there be no surrender of salt.”- Mahatma Gandhi
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INTRODUCTION
In quest of solving normative issues related to government, contemporary legal
and political philosophers engage themselves with analyzing concepts such as
legitimacy, authority, justice, and democracy in an attempt to offer a case of
justification for the government, its right to rule, and the corresponding duty of its
citizens to obey.4 Civil disobedience has become one of the most widely discussed
and popular topics of investigation in jurisprudence as it challenges the traditional
concept of people’s obligation to obey the law, the government’s authority, and a
citizen’s duty and right against an unjust law, be the government legitimate or
illegitimate.5 It has almost been standardized by John Rawls’ famous A Theory of
Justice as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law
usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the
government.”6 While this fits neatly within Rawls’ liberalist political theory of
justice, this is on no account a comprehensive definition of civil disobedience. In
fact, Rawls admits that his theory only considers the role of civil disobedience in a
legitimate, democratic, and nearly just regime.7 Whilst scholars fervently offer
accounts and defenses to political disobedience, they completely ignore one of the
most vitally important categories of it, namely revolutionary disobedience.8
This Article is written with an aim of offering a theory of revolutionary
disobedience, its features, nature, and theoretical implications. Revolutionary
disobedience differs from other forms of political disobedience in a fundamental
manner as it denies the authority of the government and possibly its legitimacy whilst
ordinary civil disobedience recognizes them.9 Unlike civil disobedience,
revolutionary disobedience undermines or even demolishes the foundation of
authority of a government, leading to its destruction and reconstruction. The
pertinent state might also be involved and thereby reconstructed, by which a new
state is produced. Moreover, in such a process, the people, or demos, of a polity may
credibly ask themselves the questions central to their collective existence: Who are
we and are we a people? The resort to revolutionary disobedience to affirm the
collective identity of a demos after legal means are exhausted gives a demos a way
out of the larger people or state which they may not have chosen to be part of in the
first place or when they choose to void the constitutional contract with the larger
demos that they no longer desire to be a part of. In this sense, revolutionary
_________________________
4.
See, e.g., id. at 319–23; see JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 18–19, 263–264 (2d ed. 2009).
5.
See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 1, at 319–23; RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 18–19, 263–
264.
6.
RAWLS, supra note 1, at 320.
7.
Id. at 319.
8.
Surprisingly and intriguingly, scholars have noticed such form of disobedience but have never given a
full account of what it is as yet. Joseph Raz defines revolutionary disobedience as “a politically motivated breach of
law designed to change or to contribute directly to a change of government or of the constitutional arrangements
(the system of government).” RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 263. This is indeed an illuminating
point to commence with. Nonetheless, it is apparently underdeveloped. One may reasonably ask: Where does this
definition come from? How do we examine its accuracy? How could it possibly be achieved? How is it justified?
This article attempts to answer these questions and many more. For my full-fledged theory of revolutionary
disobedience, see Part VII.
9.
See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 321.
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disobedience is potentially demos-defining. Given its nature, it has a far wider scope
of issues to cope with than civil disobedience, including but not confined to the
government, state, constitution, and the democratic boundary problem. It is justified
by its inherently democratic nature, which renders it an exertion of selfdetermination by the people, be the government legitimate or illegitimate.
Revolutionary disobedience is, in theory, a hybrid of political disobedience and
revolution, an act that denies the authority of a regime by violating its law and that
seeks to bring about a revolution.
Part I of this Article offers a theoretical comparison between political
disobedience, civil resistance, and revolution, explicating why revolutionary
disobedience is a sui generis political act that does not easily fall into any of these
traditional categories. Part II explores the concepts of authority and legitimacy,
which are the foundations of any functioning government and constitutional order,
the forfeiture of which invalidates the government’s role in representing the people,
enabling the people as popular sovereign to directly assert their will to rewrite the
constitution of the state. Part III analyzes the constitutional language of constituent
power, which allows us to make sense of revolution and democracy, whereas Part
IV studies what “the state” and “the constitution” are under which we find ourselves
being cast as well as legally bound, separating one people from another. We must
fully grasp these notions before a theoretical account of revolutionary disobedience
is possible. Part V sketches the democratic boundary problem, which has been the
center of debate of both political philosophy and jurisprudence. Solutions to the
problem are propounded with the republican democratic theory, liberal nationalism
theory, ontology, and revolutionary disobedience, which can potentially be
employed to define a demos as well as separate it from others. I take the Hong Kong
people as an instance and contend how they are an independent demos from the
Chinese people. In Part VI, I take a quintessential case of political disobedience,
namely the Indian Independence Movement, and argue how it is a paradigm of
revolutionary disobedience instead of merely civil disobedience as most take it to be.
Part VII advances a full theoretical discourse of revolutionary disobedience as well
as its definition and nature. The Umbrella Movement has been taken as a case study
for my argument that civil disobedience relies heavily on the reaction and responseability of the subject to which it appeals, and where this fails an impasse arises. The
only means that is left then seems to be violence. I contend that this is a false
dichotomy as non-violent revolutionary disobedience could still be resorted to as the
middle ground. In the last part of this Article, Part VIII, I reply to the Hong Kong
Bar Association to argue that it has misunderstood the meaning of the rule of law.
Offering a theoretical analysis of the concept, I argue that the Bar Association’s
misconception has served to stifle the Umbrella Movement and how adherence to its
statements could suppress constitutional creativity. In addition, I contend that
revolutionary disobedience is perfectly compatible with the rule of law.
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I. POLITICAL DISOBEDIENCE, CIVIL RESISTANCE, AND REVOLUTION: HOW
ARE THEY DIFFERENT?
Civil disobedience enjoys the definition of a public and politically motivated act
in breach of law, which is carried out in demonstration of the wrongfulness or
injustice of a law or policy of the government.10 The act can be direct in breaching
the unjust law itself or “indirect” as in violating another law or laws to protest against
the wicked law.11 The genesis of the term civil disobedience can be traced back to
Thoreau, who argues that it is the duty of a citizen to disobey any unjust law of the
state, hence giving the disobedience its civil character.12 Later, John Rawls fits civil
disobedience into his liberal theory of justice in order to analyze its role in a
democratic and largely just state, as explained earlier.13 The “civil disobedience” that
Rawls defends is the exception to the “limits and qualifications” of the majority rule
under democracy, which is grounded in the fundamental rights of people.14 Hence,
Markovits calls this theory “liberal disobedience”: the civil disobedience model
under liberalism that is brought out to defend the inalienable rights of people, the
importance of which overrides even democracy.15 Having diagnosed the theoretical
blind spot of the conventional liberal disobedience paradigm, Markovits coined the
term “democratic disobedience” to make room for the role of civil disobedience to
enhance democracy.16 Democratic disobedience, under his theory, makes possible
the exposure of the democratic deficit of a law or policy by breaking the relevant
law.17 All these different forms of disobedience, given their political nature, can be
framed into one single term, namely political disobedience: a disobedience of law
that is politically motivated that may be justified under certain conditions.18 But
contrary to the traditional concept of civil disobedience, which constitutes the
justifiable exception to the violation of law,19 there is a sui generis type of political
disobedience that denies the authority and/or legitimacy of the government and/or
the state. This is “revolutionary disobedience.” It is politically driven and thus falls
under the umbrella of political disobedience, but it is different from the classic notion
_________________________
10.
This is a broad definition of civil disobedience. Rawls’ formula, in contrast, is a narrow one. He
emphasizes the distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious refusal, in that he defines the latter as noncompliance with law that offends one’s conscience or personal integrity, which does not have to appeal to the
majority’s sense of justice as the former does, and it may not be based on political principles but religious or other
reasons. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 321, 323–24. It is reasonable to say that under normal usage, conscientious refusal
is a subdivision of civil disobedience. Another criterion that Rawls imposes on civil disobedience is the adherence
to non-violence. Id. at 321. Contra Howard Zinn who defines civil disobedience broadly as “the deliberate violation
of law for a vital social purpose,” leaving open the question of means, which can be violent or non-violent. HOWARD
ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY: NINE FALLACIES ON LAW AND ORDER 39–40 (Haymarket Books 2013)
(1968).
11.
See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 320.
12.
See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 389 (Penguin Books ed., 1986).
13.
RAWLS, supra note 1, at 319.
14.
Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 1899 (2005).
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 1902.
17.
Id.
18.
See id. at 1898, 1898 n.2.
19.
See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 321.
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of civil disobedience in its purpose to directly oust the office of government by its
course of action and/or to reconstruct the constitution and the state.20
Traditionally, many scholars have confined the definition and focus of political
disobedience to non-revolutionary acts that violate specific laws so as to appeal to
the majority’s sense of justice and manifest that the underlying principles of the
society are not “respected.”21 Implicitly, the citizens only challenge the unjust law
but acknowledge the democratic authority of the government or state because they
recognize the “legitimacy of the constitution.”22 But even if the constitution or its
legitimacy is recognized, government may act in contravention of its conferred
power or commit other atrocities that breach the social contract, legitimizing the
people’s demand to oust the government.23 It is perfectly possible for the constitution
to be highly respected but that the government violates those principles, which may
lead to a challenge of governmental authority and its legitimacy. In cases where the
principles are not severely violated by the government, the legitimacy and authority
of the government need not be denied. For instance, in the United States from 1955
to 1965 when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. engaged in a civil disobedience movement
against racial segregation, he did not deny the legitimacy or authority of the U.S.
government.24 But given that those violations are sufficiently serious, it may lead to
a challenge of the state authority, which undermines it or possibly destroys it. Not to
mention, if the people deny the legitimacy of the constitution or aim to change it, it
may lead to a complete destruction of the state authority. Before analyzing the
sophisticated concept of authority and legitimacy, it is insightful for us to look at two
such forms of challenge to state authority, namely civil resistance and revolution.
Civil resistance can be defined as a non-violent political action25 that resists the
authority of the state.26 This may involve widespread activities by which people
challenge a regime, including democratic ones.27 There are many actions that fall
under the category of civil resistance, as Gandhi suggests, such as non-cooperation
and civil disobedience.28 Whilst the latter breaks the law, the former does not
necessarily do so, which includes actions such as “strike, walk-out, hartal,29 and
resignation of offices.”30 It should be noted that resistance to state authority does not
entail a rejection of it.31 In fact, David Bell suggests that resistance “is more extreme
_________________________
20.
The requirement of “direct” is vitally important here. This is because civil disobedience can also
contribute, albeit indirectly, to a change of constitution, just as what happened in the process and as the aftermath of
the American Civil Rights Movement. See id.
21.
Id. at 320.
22.
Id. at 319.
23.
Id. at 321.
24.
See ZINN, supra note 10, at 29.
25.
Adam Roberts, Introduction, in CIVIL RESISTANCE AND POWER POLITICS 1 (Adam Roberts & Timothy
Garton Ash eds., 2009).
26.
DAVID V. J. BELL, RESISTANCE AND REVOLUTION 2 (1973).
27.
Id.
28.
JOAN V. BONDURANT, CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE: THE GANDHIAN PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT 36
(rev. ed. 1988).
29.
Id. at 36 n.2 (meaning the “voluntary closing of shops and businesses”).
30.
Id. at 36.
31.
See Judith Brown, Gandhi and Civil Resistance in India, 1917–47: Key Issues, in CIVIL RESISTANCE
AND POWER POLITICS, supra note 25, at 43, 43–44. This point can be illustrated by the fact that Gandhi initiated a
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than protest, which aims at the change of policy but does not reject the authority of
the policy maker.”32 According to this logic, the line of difference between civil
resistance and revolution can be drawn by the latter’s rejection of authority of the
government. But it is not always clear that civil resistance does not reject the
authority of the government. Consider the case of Gandhi. Some scholars analyze
his 1917–1947 movement, including his independence movement, as a case of civil
resistance33 whilst others name it a “revolution”.34 This sheds light on the
ambivalence of the concepts. The concept of revolution is even more unclear. In
Resistance and Revolution, David Bell defines it as “a form of internal war,” which
necessarily involves violence.35 He sees it as the extreme case of resistance that aims
at “changing the entire system,” which is highly “organized, violent and widespread
in participation.”36 This forces us to look back at the origin of “revolution,” which
originally implies the rotation of the wheel of change via a complete turn, and in
politics it means “the cyclical view of history.”37 Some other scholars offer another
definition of revolution, which does not include the concept of violence.38 Revisiting
the concept, Eugene Kamenka offers a seemingly more comprehensive definition:
Revolution is a sharp, sudden change in the social location of
political power, expressing itself in the radical transformation of the
process of government, of the official foundations of sovereignty or
legitimacy and of the conception of the social order. Such
transformations, it has usually been believed, could not normally
occur without violence, but if they did, they would still, though
bloodless, be revolutions.39
These definitions would be invaluable to the following discussion. For now, the
most vital question to be answered is: Why do we need a concept of revolutionary
disobedience? While civil resistance is immensely important to the understanding of
the authority relationship between citizens and the state, for it does not necessarily
entail violations of the law, it is at best ancillary for the purpose of this Article. Nor
is the concept “revolution” sufficient as it is intrinsically ambiguous. Any “sharp and
sudden” change in the social location of political power or the foundations of
sovereignty or legitimacy or the notion of the social order can be called a political
revolution.40 Hence, Bruce Ackerman names the American Civil Rights Movement
_________________________
number of resistance movements in India in 1917 and 1918. Id. at 43. Some argue that the early resistance
movements were not conducted in rejection of the British ruling but to demonstrate local socio-economic issues. Id.
at 44.
32.
BELL, supra note 26, at 4.
33.
BROWN, supra note 31, at 44.
34.
See, e.g., DEVI PRASAD, GANDHI AND REVOLUTION 31 (2012).
35.
BELL, supra note 26, at 9–10.
36.
Id. at 10.
37.
Id. at 7.
38.
See, e.g., Eugene Kamenka, The Concept of a Political Revolution, in REVOLUTION 122, 124 (Carl J.
Friedrich ed., 2007).
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
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in the 1950s and 1960s the “Civil Rights Revolution.”41 But the “Revolution” that
brought about the legal reform in abolishing discrimination against black Americans
was mainly achieved by civil disobedience and resistance movements.42 This is not
an act of revolutionary disobedience under current definition, which requires a
challenge to the authority and/or legitimacy of the government. Moreover, for a
“revolution” to succeed, there are necessarily a wide range of acts which are designed
to bring about the change, including rallies, petitions, hunger strikes, and appeals to
international forums.43 It is necessary to isolate revolutionary disobedience from
other forms or strategies of revolutions to be studied in jurisprudence, which has its
own legal dimension as well as theoretical issues and perplexities that are not bound
up with the other issues in revolution that involve different tactics and power politics.
Terminology is the poetic moment of thought that allows us to understand a
phenomenon.44 Whilst this holds true for the theory of revolutionary disobedience,
the introduction of the term also arises out of practical necessity.
II. THE FOUNDATION OF GOVERNMENT: AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY
In order to comprehend the nature of revolutionary disobedience, it is absolutely
crucial to analyze theories of authority as they tell us about the relationship between
the government and the people. Authority is also inextricably linked to the notion of
legitimacy as it derives its power from those who recognize its authority.45 Also,
“authority” connotes a legitimate right to impose sanctions and rests on its capacity
in offering justifications of its actions,46 which requires people’s willingness to
accept its commands.47 This makes it distinguishable from other political forms such
as “power” or mere “force.” We will come back to the concept of legitimacy later.
We shall now consider some theories of authority.
A. Flathman’s Practice of Authority: Authority as a Relationship
What is authority? Many philosophers attempt to answer the question but fail to
make a comprehensive set of arguments. Joseph Raz has famously given his
theoretical account of “the authority of law,” in which he identifies certain features
of authority, which he deems to be essential.48 A practical authority, as opposed to a
theoretical authority, offers reasons for action and not merely to be believed.49 More
precisely, an authority offers a reason for action and simultaneously an exclusionary
_________________________
41.
See Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 3110 (2014).
42.
See id. at 3116–19.
43.
See generally Martha Minow, Symposium, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for
Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723, 736 (1991) (discussing social changes and revolutions).
44.
Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus?, in WHAT IS AN APPARATUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 12 (David
Kishik & Stefan Pedatella trans., Stanford Univ. Press 2009) (2006).
45.
BELL, supra note 26, at 43.
46.
Id. at 41.
47.
Id. at 43.
48.
See RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 19.
49.
JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 195 (1994).
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reason for disregarding (other) reasons against it.50 He names this “protected reasons
for an action.”51 This is the basis for his “pre-emptive thesis,” which stipulates that
an authoritative directive, which requires performance, is itself a reason for its
performance, which should not be assessed with other reasons in deciding what one
should do, and the directive should replace at least some of the original reasons.52
This is because authorities exist for a purpose, due to their capacity to better arrive
at the right reasons and decisions than their subjects.53 This is his “normal
justification thesis.”54 An authority is usually only legitimate when it is capable of
being so.55 Also, an authority’s decisions should depend upon the reasons, which
originally apply to its subjects.56 This is the “dependence thesis.”57 Nonetheless, it is
not clear at all why for an authority to be “authoritative,” its utterances must be
deemed to be “exclusionary reasons” and not merely very weighty reasons that are
usually “overriding.”58 The pre-emptive thesis also creates some dilemmas for
political disobedience, as we shall see in the final part. In any instance, Raz’s thesis
at best only identifies certain features of authority, but it does not answer the question
of what authority is, leaving us with more perplexities than answers.
We can now turn to some other philosophers who genuinely attempt to answer
the question. Hannah Arendt thinks that “authority” no longer exists in modern time
due to the collapse of the Roman Empire and the Church in medieval Europe.59 In
her conception, “authority” necessarily entails beliefs to tradition and religion, as
well as authoritarian and religious rulings of the ruling class.60 As Flathman
persuasively argues, this is a confusion of a specific kind of authority with a
“necessary condition” of all forms of authority.61
_________________________
50.
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 18.
51.
See id.
52.
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 49, at 198.
53.
Id. at 199.
54.
Id. at 198.
55.
Id. at 199.
56.
Id. at 198.
57.
Id.
58.
Different jurists have attempted a variety of ways in rebutting Raz’s pre-emptive thesis. One of such
theories argue that
to comply with an authoritative directive might involve treating it as strong evidence
regarding the balance of content-dependent reasons and to act on the basis of it, as well as all
of other available evidence. Authoritative directives would not pre-empt the reasons that they
are meant to reflect- they would be additional reasons that lend their support to the pro-content
side of the balance and would be considered alongside all of the other content-dependent
reasons.
See Scott Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 410
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). This is what Shapiro called the “simple model.” Id. Other jurists contend
differently, but they similarly do not see how authoritative directive must be “exclusionary” and “pre-emptive.” Id.
at 411–12.
59.
HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 93, 98
(Penguin Books ed., 2006) (1954).
60.
Id. at 98.
61.
RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: AUTHORITY AND THE
AUTHORITATIVE 75 (1980).
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Flathman distinguishes two traditional categories of theories of authorities.62 The
first is substantive-purposive theories (S-P theories), which relate authority to
specific features and telos.63 Arendt’s argument and Plato’s Republic belong to this
category.64 The other type is formal-procedural theories (F-P theories), which
theorize general or universal features of authority and set it apart from its purpose,
where possible and necessary, of a particular community.65 According to this
categorization, theories of Michael Oakeshott and Richard Friedman belong to this
latter type.66 Oakeshott, for instance, distinguishes between “being an authority on
some subject or activity” and being in authority “in some sort of association or
organization,”67 whilst the former offers reason for belief, and the latter provides
reason for action.68 An example of “an authority” is an advisor whose advice has to
be believed by one’s client, while legislators and judges are examples of “in
authority” who occupy the governmental offices. Flathman’s theory, namely the
“practice of authority,”69 builds upon but refines this concept. His theory deserves
special attention not only due to its capacity to explain what authority is but also
when it commences and ends. He argues that the “in-an distinction” is not
categorical,70 considering that it is possible for a person to be “an authority” whilst
also occupying the office or position of authority such as a judge.71 Hereafter, we
refer to a person who occupies the office or position as “in authority,” regardless of
whether the person is or is not “an authority,” as this is how Flathman uses the term.
But besides the account of “in and an authority,” there are also criteria, including
rules, by which we use to identify what power the authority is entitled thereunder.
Flathman uses the Fox Native Americans to illustrate this point.72 The Fox believed
in equality between people and abhored any forms of hierarchy or command.73
“[T]ribal decisions [were] made unanimously or not at all.”74 “Village
chieftainships” were merely symbolic offices.75 However, the Fox did have customs
and conventions to which they adhered.76 “When the Fox conformed to these
arrangements they did so largely because they believed that the arrangements had a
distinctive standing.”77 These “authoritative directives” or “arrangements” have the
same functions or power as a person “in authority.”78 These, as Flathman calls it, are
_________________________
62.
Id. at 14–16.
63.
Id.
64.
See id. at 16.
65.
Id. at 14–16.
66.
Id. at 38.
67.
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 16.
68.
Id. at 16–17.
69.
See id. at 32.
70.
See id.
71.
Id. A judge, when making a judgment, offers a reason for action and often a justification to be believed,
even though the subject does not have to believe that it is justified.
72.
Id. at 24–25.
73.
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 24.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id. at 25.
77.
Id.
78.
Id. at 26.
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“the authoritative”: “values, beliefs and arrangements” that are authoritative
credentials for the members thereof.79 In a modern state, the constitution is the most
fundamental “authoritative” thereof. “The authoritative” are not part of “in
authority” as they are not “persons” occupying the office or position but are
authoritative propositions that people adhere to, which can also include credentials,
the fulfilment of which validates one’s claim to a position.80 This implies that the
underlying shared values and beliefs of the members of an association compose the
fundamentals (or constitution) of the association: “the recognized locus of in
authority.”81 An authority will lose its claim if people do not believe in it: “[T]here
will not be any authority unless some substantial number of the participants believe
that there ought to be rules of some sort and that these and not those putative or
proposed rules ought in fact to be rules.”82 That is to say, when people do not believe
the constitution to be true or “should continue to be true,” the authority of “the
authoritative” will disappear.83 For the authority to stand, the majority do not have
to think that the constitution or “the authoritative” are desirable, but it has to be at
least acceptable to them.84 Indeed, Flathman contends that there is little likelihood
that a single set of “consciously held” and coherent values and beliefs will be
accepted by all members of the modern states,85 as F-P theories rightly argue, but the
possibility or reality is that there is “a web of overlapping, sometimes conflicting,
sometimes complementary and mutually reinforcing values and beliefs that inform,
influence, and, to varying degrees in various situations, support in authority.”86
Unlike Raz, who only identifies several features that he thinks are inalienable to
(legitimate) authority,87 Flathman’s theory sets out a larger framework, which is
capable of explicating the role of political disobedience and revolution in an
authority relationship.88 Because the property of authority lies in its capacity in
providing reasons to its subjects to conform to, the failure of offering such reasons
for acting symbolizes its disappearance.89 In Flathman’s words, “authority advances
a reason why B should conform with it.”90 Indeed an “in-authority” may not provide
justified or genuine reasons for its utterances, even though authority necessarily
claims normative justifications for itself, such as its command being “legitimate” or
its having “a right to rule.”91 Authority has its own conceptions of “right” and
“wrong,” “just” and “unjust,” and it demands its subjects’ obligations, which may
not accord to the majority’s conception of the concepts.92 Strong and persistent
_________________________
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 21.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 88–89.
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 88.
Id.
See RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 19.
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 119.
Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 118.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 25–28 (1986).
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 118.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss2/3

12

: Revolutionary Disobedience

Spring 2017

Revolutionary Disobedience

211

objection to “the authoritative” and “in authority” may mark an end of the authority
relationship.93 It would be inconceivable, contends Flathman, that the ruled object to
every single utterance of the authority or find them unreasonable, and the authority
could still stand.94 Under such circumstances, the existing political system may still
persist due to the power or force of tyranny, but this is not authority.95 What is the
difference between civil disobedience and revolution, then? Civil disobedients
confine their actions within the authority relationship.96 They reject certain
utterances, rules or actions of the authority, but they do not attempt to bring the
authority relationship to an end.97 They manifest their adherence to the authority by
accepting the fact that the authority is not deprived of attaching and enforcing legal
sanctions against disobedience, and they are not justified in resisting or objecting to
the application of sanctions against their disobedience.98 In contrast, revolutionaries
attempt to end the authority relationship.99 In a successful revolution, it is most often
and highly probable that the political authority loses its basis in the majority’s eyes.
In other words, the political authority loses its “standing as a reason on which
associates recognize that they should ordinarily act.”100 A revolution aims at
weakening or destroying the existing practice of authority, and if this happens to a
case of political disobedience, the movement has failed as it crosses its confines.101
In fact, civil disobedience is capable of protecting the existing practice of authority
_________________________
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
A critical reader might ask here: How could we distinguish if there is an authority relationship between
the people and government or whether it is a tyrannical relationship within a certain state? Does an authority
relationship only exist or is most often seen in a largely democratic state? It may be helpful to introduce Kojeve’s
conception of authority to solve the puzzle. Authority itself entails the possibility of reaction against it. As Kojeve
analyzes, all forms of authority share a common feature: “they make possible the exercise of an action that does not
provoke a reaction, because those who could have reacted abstain from doing so consciously and voluntarily”.
ALEXANDRE KOJEVE, THE NOTION OF AUTHORITY 13 (François Terré ed., Hager Weslati trans., 2014). That said,
“reaction remains possible and the renunciation is conscious and voluntary.” Id. Therefore, in an authority
relationship, the subject of authority makes its submission to the enforcer, who can always react and subvert such
relationship. See id. at 14–16.
My central argument here is this: a tyrannical relationship also falls within the authority relationship paradigm.
Kojeve classifies the types of authority into four categories: The authority of the father over child; the authority of
master over slave; the authority of the leader; and lastly, the authority of the judge. Id. An authority, argues Kojeve,
can possess one or a mix of these types. Id. What is relevant to my contention is the absolute authority owned by the
master over slave: The slave “consciously and voluntarily renounces the opportunity he has of reacting against the
action of the Master; he does so because he knows that this reaction puts his life at risk and because he does not want
to accept this risk.” Id. at 18. Likewise, the people under a tyranny remain possible to react against it, but may choose
not to do so for the fear of the cost of non-submission: death. Hence, the relationship that exists between any people
and government is one of authority, even the type of authority relationship that stands between a democratic
government and its people would be different to one of tyranny: In the former, the raison d’être for the relationship
is more or less sound and justified whilst in the latter, the relationship persists for the people’s fear of death or
oppression. Authority is the offering of reason for action. For a tyranny its authority stands only with its oppressive
instruments and people’s fear of risking their lives, the authority is immensely fragile.
96.
FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 120.
97.
See id. at 120. (“It is for this reason that most proponents . . . have argued that the action must be . . .
done with the expectation that arrest and punishment will properly ensue.”).
98.
Id. at 121 (concurring with John Rawls’ argument that the civil disobedients have to willingly accept
punishment for their actions, which sets their act within the constitutional confines).
99.
See id. at 117.
100.
Id. at 119.
101.
Id at 120.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017

13

Barry Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3

212

Barry Law Review

Vol. 22, No. 2

in acting against the demise of “the then authoritative” or “in authority,” which may
lead to its ultimate irreversible denial and destruction.102
With Flathman’s theoretical framework in mind, we are able to offer an account
of revolutionary disobedience’s purpose, functions, and visions. But before so doing,
we need to examine the twin concept of authority: legitimacy.
B. The Concept of Legitimacy
There are a great number of theories and definitions of legitimacy, and for the
purpose of deciding when a revolutionary disobedience is justified, a definition of
democratic and justice-based legitimacy shall be constructed.103 More specifically,
this section concerns the legitimacy of the government and not that of the “state.”104
Legitimacy can be defined semantically as a moral or political standard to be
employed in the evaluation of the degree to which laws or institutions satisfy the
minimum requirements that must be met.105 “An entity has political legitimacy if and
only if it is morally justified in exercising political power. The exercise of political
power may be defined as the (credible) attempt to achieve supremacy in the making,
application, and enforcement of laws within a jurisdiction.”106 This is a value-neutral
definition of the concept of legitimacy.107 Philosophers give different meaning to the
concept in order to theorize the minimum conditions that the government must
satisfy, the failure of which will justify resistance.108 In this sense, legitimacy is
different from “justice,” which is an ideal standard in which a state pursues but never
fully obtains.109
We have considered Raz’s arguments, for whom an authority is legitimate only
if it satisfies his normal justification thesis.110 For Rawls, the standard of legitimacy
for legislation is that “the law actually voted is, so far as one can ascertain, within
_________________________
102.
See FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 120.
103.
It should be noted that “legitimacy” defined in this essay is a normative concept, which is in a sense
universal in that any communities should impose such minimum standards on the state. It is different from definitions
of legitimacy such as “recognitional legitimacy”—legitimacy of the state that is recognized by other states
internationally. See JORDY ROCHELEAU, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 935–36 (Deen K.
Chatterjee ed., 2011).
104.
For the present purpose, the “state” could be understood as a structure of institutions and the government
merely an agent of it. Legitimacy is the minimum threshold that any ruling authorities of a polity must pass, the
fulfilment of which justifies their authority over their subjects. (But this is not to say, given their legitimacy, the
people are thereby unjustified to force them out of office.) “States” are at times understood as the monopoly of force
in a community, in which sense it is synonymous with government. Under such definition, legitimacy can be a
normative standard for both the government and the “state,” i.e. the entity is justified in its domination to exercise
political power and wield authority over the people. But this Weberian conception of the state fails to grasp its full
implications, including its legal connotations. The state is best understood as a scheme of intelligibility and not the
monopoly of power and violence. See infra section 4 for a full-fledged analysis. To avoid confusion, legitimacy in
this section refers to government legitimacy and not state legitimacy.
105.
ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 233–34 (2012).
106.
Id. at 233; cf. Richard E. Flathman, Legitimacy, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 678 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2012) (arguing that “[g]overnments that are legitimate have the ‘right
to rule’”).
107.
BUCHANAN, supra note 105, at 432.
108.
See Fabienne Peter, Political Legitimacy (May 13, 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/.
109.
BUCHANAN, supra note 105, at 432.
110.
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 91, at 53.
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the range of those that could reasonably be favored by rational legislators
conscientiously trying to follow the principles of justice.”111 A regime which
systematically enacts legislation in defiance of principles of justice forfeits its
legitimacy.112 Legitimacy, according to the above definition, should not be reduced
to “lawfulness,” as what is legal in a country may be politically or morally unjust,
judging from a normative standard. The concept of legitimacy pursued in the essay
is normative, which is not to be confused with what is “believed” to be legitimate.
Here, the minimum thresholds that any government must pass are suggested.
Firstly, the government must satisfy Raz’s normal justification thesis.
[T]he normal way to establish that a person has authority over
another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely
better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the
alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the
alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them,
rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him
directly.113
This is actually axiomatic. If the government is not capable of fulfilling its tasks
assigned by the governed, or at least “good enough” in managing its assignments,
then there is no point in keeping the “in-authority.” It follows from this that the
government must not transgress the constitution so long as it aligns with the will of
the popular sovereign,114 unless it is empowered by the people to do so.
Secondly, the government must do a credible job in the protection of human
rights. The state exists for a reason, in that it is a better mechanism in assigning duties
and protecting rights than a state of nature, or at least it is believed or agreed to be
so.115 Philosophers commonly agree that human beings have certain inalienable
_________________________
111.
RAWLS, supra note 1, at 318.
112.
See Alexander Kaufman, Political Authority, Civil Disobedience, Revolution, in A COMPANION TO
RAWLS 219 (Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., 2013).
113.
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 91, at 53.
114.
The idea of popular sovereign (the people who exercise the sovereign power) or popular sovereignty (the
sovereign power which the people exert) perplexes some as a theoretical oddity: It seems to be both a collection of
mortal individuals and an enduring collective body. It only makes a rare fleeting appearance with a high turnout, an
overwhelming majority and a clear message. How could we make sense of it? Sovereignty is best understood as the
absolute authority of the autonomous public sphere of a state. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW
186 (2012). Where the people exercise this ultimate authority, they become the popular sovereign.
This conception of “popular sovereignty” accords with Espejo’s usage of it. She stresses that the term is merely
descriptive and does not necessarily carry normative weight. “To the extent that the people rules itself, it can be the
highest source of power and authority in the state.” PAULINA OCHOA. ESPEJO, THE TIME OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY 186 (2011). Hence, where the people have a final say over a political subject, they exercise popular
sovereignty on that matter. In a representative democracy, since people cannot make a decision on every political
matter, mostly they only exert popular sovereignty over subjects of constitutional significance: the practices of
constituting, governing and changing a set of institutions which are the highest authority for all the individuals
intensely affected by these institutions. Referendum is one of the most common procedures through which the people
can voice their will, but popular sovereignty in such scenario can only be exerted when the government gives effect
to the result.
115.
See BUCHANAN, supra note 105, at 247 (contending that the coercive and monopolistic character of the
state necessitates justifications for its existence, which is capable of producing harm, curtailing freedom, and creating
inequalities).
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rights, whether because they believe a basic dignity or moral worth is essential to
human’s rational capacity of choosing116 or because rights are central to their
autonomy and well-being.117 This is not the venue to engage in the critical discussion
of what “inalienable rights” are, but to point out at least that most theorists agree that
certain rights, such as civil and political rights, which are also called negative rights,
are the absolute basic living conditions that everyone deserves to enjoy.118
Thirdly, the government must be entrusted with its office and power by
democratic authorization. If satisfied, the government under the state enjoys
democratic legitimacy. Democracy, which some argue is an intrinsic part of justice,
serves to recognize that people should have a stake in the making of their community,
where their rights are recognized institutionally.119 It also recognizes the principle of
fair equality of opportunity between citizens to participate in governmental offices,
in that at least they have an equal right to fight for the positions, which also serves
as a mechanism to deter the abuse of offices.120
If we combine these different basic standards of legitimacy, a government is only
legitimate so long as it does not transgress its assignment by the people and remains
effective in expressing the people’s will and re-presenting them. It must hold its
office in conformity to the constitution as legitimized by the popular sovereign and
must not overstep the constitutional contract between itself and the people.
Furthermore, the government must protect human rights, the massive failure of
which could forfeit it of its legitimacy. The government’s power must also be
democratically conferred to be endowed with democratic legitimacy. Legitimacy
provides the minimum standard that a government must live up to, the failure of
which would justify the initiation of revolutionary disobedience. But as we shall see,
the lack of legitimacy is only one of the conditions that justifies the people’s assertion
of popular sovereignty, and it is ultimately left to the people to determine whether
they still accept the government to be in office.
III. CONSTITUENT POWER, AUTHORITY, AND REVOLUTION
In the previous section, we have come to learn that authority is a relationship.
But in order to understand the state/people relationship more deeply, with a view to
fully appreciate how a legal or political order comes into being in the first place, we
must ask more fundamental questions: How does the state gain its authority from the
start and how do “the authoritative” (or constitution) gain its status? How does the
state constitute itself and derive its power or authority? What is a constitution? How
can it be established by revolution? Offering an answer to these questions is essential
in getting to know what revolutionary disobedience really is. To do so, we need to
understand the notion of constituent power.
_________________________
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

RAYMOND PLANT, MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 263 (1991).
Id. at 266.
See id. at 263.
See ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, 113 (1989).
See id.
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Constituent power is a concept in constitutional language that specifies the
ultimate source of authority in the state.121 During the Enlightenment in eighteenth
century Europe, the concept was created in affirming that the ultimate source of
political authority derives from “the people” and that the constitution is an
expression of the constituent power of the people in making and remaking the
“institutional arrangements through which they are governed.”122 The constitution is
merely a “juridical instrument,” which derives its authority from the people through
the principle of self-determination.123 In contrast to the constituent power, there is
the “constituted power,” the exercise of political power in an established form, which
should receive its authorization from the people.124 The government, which exercises
delegated authority, is a type of constituted power.125 The idea of constituent power
is of significance in the study of constitutionalism and for this paper, as it is central
to understanding the nature of revolution, constitution, authority, democracy, and
self-constitution of a community (or state).
A. Three Schools on Constituent Power
Here, we will consider three streams of legal thoughts and their interpretation of
constituent power so as to better understand its nature. First, normativism regards
legal ordering as self-sufficient and thus constituent power redundant.126
Normativists, such as John Austin, contend that law is defined entirely in nonnormative terms and even constitutional law is just a type of political morality.127
The second school, decisionism, is founded upon “law as will.”128 The most
prominent decisionist, Carl Schmitt, claims that modern constitutions cannot
guarantee their own existence and must be underwritten by a sovereign will: the
constituent power.129 For decisionists, constituent power is important as they attempt
to answer the question of how legal authority is generated within the political
sphere.130 Constitutional legality is not self-generating: The practice of legality rests
upon conditions outside itself, which it cannot guarantee.131 Schmitt’s answer to the
question is that the constitution is a historical result of specific political decisions,
which are given the jural form as the constituent power, hence decisionism.132 At the
base of the constitution is a decision,133 one of the sovereign will, which involves an
_________________________
121.
It is both a normative and explanatory concept. Martin Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power,
13(2) EUR. J. POL. THEORY 218, 219–21 (2014); see, e.g., Biancamaria Fontana, Democracy and the French
Revolution, in DEMOCRACY THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY 107–09 (John Dunn ed., 1992).
122.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 219.
123.
Id.
124.
Id. at 220.
125.
See id.
126.
See id. at 219.
127.
Id. at 221.
128.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 219.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 224.
131.
Id. at 223.
132.
Id. at 224.
133.
Id.
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exercise of constituent power.134 Schmitt further defines the constituent power as
“the political will, whose power or authority is capable of making the concrete,
comprehensive decision over the type and form of its own political existence.”135 It
is a “concrete political being,” which “determines the nature of the institutional
arrangement of political unity.”136 “It establishes the constitution. And its continuing
existence (as sovereign will) bolsters the authority of the constitution.”137 Despite its
insight, Schmitt places great emphasis on the preservation of the “sovereign will” as
the self-identity of “the people.”138 For him, in order to preserve political unity,
political leaders need to make genuine decisions on behalf of “the people,” which
are a united will.139 This creates the great danger of totalitarianism in attempting to
realize “the people-as-one,” which may regard any form of opposition as enemy.140
We now consider the third school, namely relationalism, which sees constituent
power as a relationship of political right.141 Whilst decisionism fails to identify who
“the people” really are, turning it into what the dictatorial sovereign regards them as
being, relationalism presents a better case. It addresses the paradox of constituent
power, namely the tension between constituent power and constituted power, by
referring to reflexive identity in the process of “self-constitution.”142 The
foundational moment is the origin of the paradox, as in the founding process, “the
people” who exercise the constituent power to establish a constitution must also
claim to act as a constituted power.143 In Hans Lindahl’s words,
[L]egislation, in its most powerful manifestation, is the exercise of
constituent power, an act that creates the first constitution without
being empowered to do so; but because the law can only think of
power as legal power, an act can only initiate a legal order if it is
retroactively interpreted as an empowered act—the exercise of
constituted power.144
Lindahl contends that “although Schmitt is right to assert that the foundational act
elicits a presence that interrupts representational practice, this rupture does not—and
_________________________
134.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 219. Schmitt defines “constitution” in a
fascinating manner. To him, constitution is not constitutional law, but a substantive concept, “the political existence
of the state,” with which one can find a “pre-established, unified will.” Id. at 255; see CARL SCHMITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 65 (Duke Univ. Press ed., Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008); see also infra Part IV for a fullfledged explanation.
135.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 224.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 234.
141.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 219.
142.
Id. at 229.
143.
Id.
144.
Hans Lindahl, Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood,
in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 11 (Martin
Loughlin and Neil Walker eds., 2008).

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss2/3

18

: Revolutionary Disobedience

Spring 2017

Revolutionary Disobedience

217

cannot—reveal a people immediately present to itself as a collective subject.”145 This
is because “the people” are an ambiguous and reflexive identity: with the
“retrojection of an inaugural act into the past” and also “the projection of community
into the future,” which allows people to retroactively self-attribute or identify
themselves with “the people” (a “we”) as established in the constitution; for instance
when they exercise their constitutional rights accordingly.146 “Constituent power
expresses the fact that unity is created from disunity, inclusion from exclusion.
Constitutional ordering is dynamic, never static.”147 In other words, the “collective
self” or “the people” is an ever-changing concept: “[T]he collective self exists in the
modes of questionability and by way of its acts, of responsiveness.”148 Solving the
paradox, the relationalist approach also eases the danger of Schmitt’s treatment of
“identity as sameness.”149 Lindahl distinguishes between idem-identity (sameness)
and ipse-identity (selfhood, implying ability to initiate), contending that selfhood
cannot be collapsed into a mere “substance that functions as the bearer of a number
of qualities and attributes.”150 The paradox of constituent power is immensely
complex,151 but it suffices here to sketch one of its basic problems and how
relationalism contributes better to our understanding of constituent power.
With these in mind, we shall now proceed to the essence of the relationalist
arguments. Constituent power implies equality between citizens.152 “It founds
constitutional rationality (normativity), but the association” between the ruler and
the ruled evolves via action (decision).153 This tension between “sovereignty” (as the
general will of the people) and the sovereign (the agent granted with authority to
enforce decisions in the name of the general will) shows that constituent power is
not merely an exercise of power (in the sense of force), but involves a dialectic of
political right (droit politique), which constantly seeks “to irritate the
institutionalized form of constituted authority.”154 Hence, constituent power cannot
be totally “absorbed into the constituted order and [be] equated with some founding
norm[s]” because “the tension that gives the political” sphere “its open and
provisional quality would” disappear.155 Constituent power is vested in the people,
which exists only insofar as it resists to be institutionalized, and the people must
persist “as an entity that is unorganised and unformed.”156 So far as political unity is
concerned, under the relational approach, it is formed through and throughout the
_________________________
145.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 229.
146.
Lindahl, supra note 144, at 19–20.
147.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 229.
148.
Lindahl, supra note 144, at 21.
149.
Id. at 13.
150.
See id. at 14–16.
151.
Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 233 (“The paradoxical nature of the
foundation rests on the fact that it both constitutes a unity (a state) and establishes a hierarchy (a governing
relationship).”).
152.
See id. at 229.
153.
See id.
154.
See id.
155.
Id. at 232.
156.
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 271.
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process in which droit politique operates to frame the constitution of the state.157
“Constituent power exists only when that multitude can project itself not just as the
expression of the many (a majority) but – in some senses at least – of the all (unity).
Without this dimension of symbolic representation, there is no constituent power.”158
B. Constituent Power, Revolution, and Democracy
With this fundamental understanding of the nature of constituent power, we can
proceed to consider how it contributes to a better understanding of revolution and
democracy. To commence with, as constituent power or the constituent sovereign
who exercises that power is the origin of any constitutional order and rests outside
of its established and institutionalized form, it is the creator of constitutions.159
Because it exists before the constituting of the legal system, it must be located
outside the juridical norm.160 Emmanuel J. Sieyes famously states that
the constituent power can do everything in relationship to
constitutional making. It is not subordinated to a previous
constitution. The nation that exercises the greatest, the most
important of its powers, must be, while carrying out this function,
free from all constraints, from any form, except the one that it deems
better to adopt.161
Likewise, Schmitt contends that in moments of genuine constitutional creations, the
constituent power is an “absolute beginning” and a beginning that springs out from
a disorder and “normative nothingness.”162 Hence, theories of constituent power
recognize that the fundamental norms and rules, as well as institutions, have no other
ground than groundless instituting sovereign act.163 Here, sovereign could be
understood as “the one who determines the constitutional form, the juridical and
political identity, and the governmental structure of a community in its entirety.”164
Sovereign could be both the people or rulers, or the government in the modern
context, so long as it exercises that supreme authority.
There are several significant features of constituent power to be drawn here.
Firstly, the constituent power signifies exception.165 It is the genesis of the
constitution and legal order, and hence, it is also the ultimate limit of any politics,
which can survive “the dissolution of governments, the disruption of legal systems,
_________________________
157.
See Loughlin, The Concept of Constituent Power, supra note 121, at 230.
158.
Id. at 231–32.
159.
See Andreas Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power, 12
CONSTELLATIONS 223, 231 (2005).
160.
See id. at 227.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. at 228.
164.
Id. at 226.
165.
This shall constitute my thesis of revolutionary disobedience as “a state of exception.” See infra Part VII
for the entire explication.
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and the collapse of instituted powers.”166 This very feature signifies its eternal ability
to create another constitution or order. Andreas Kalyvas depicts vividly the process
of creation and re-creation of a constitutional order:
From the perspective of the constituent power, sovereignty becomes
visible only during exceptional circumstances, when a constitution
is destroyed and another is not yet born. During the moment of
original constitutional making, there is a rupture, a dislocation,
which makes possible there-activation of the constituent power. For
this reason it is often portrayed as emerging ex nihilo, and described
as extra-legal or pre-juridical rather than illegal.167
Secondly, constitution-making is always related to crisis, a state of exception or the
failure of a previous regime, and the exercise of the constituent power necessarily
aims at resolving a problem, or else its exercise would be meaningless.168 Thirdly,
the exercise of the constituent power in constitution-making entails establishing the
“higher law,” namely the fundamentals of a legal order.169 The constitution
constitutes the essentials of a legal order, and it must enjoy a higher status than other
ordinary laws or else it would be easily eroded or eliminated entirely and fall prey to
selfish party politics or an impoverished or monist majoritarian concept of
democracy.170 To enjoy that “higher status,” the constitution must assume constituent
power at its basis.171 Fourthly, under the modern setting of the Westphalian
statehood, a state is established as a form of self-institution.172 The employment of
constituent power in establishing the constitution is an attempt of “a people” to freely
and consciously constitute the political form of collective existence, rather than
resorting to a mythical lawgiver or divine will.173 An example would be the founding
of the United States of America, which was to improve upon “the ancient mode of
preparing and establishing regular plans of government,” and “to bring about a
revolution by the intervention of a deliberative body of citizens.”174
The next vital question is how is the exercise of constituent power democratic?
The employment of constituent power in making the constitution gives it democratic
legitimacy.175 In a democracy, “the legitimacy of the fundamental norms and
institutions” hinges upon “how inclusive the participation of the citizens is during
the extraordinary and exceptional moment of constitution-making.”176 Constituent
politics entitles the people of a regime to exercise collective autonomy and political
_________________________
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Kalyvas, supra note 159, at 227.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
Id.
See id. This also resonates with Ackerman’s argument. See also infra Part VIII.
Id.
Kalyvas, supra note 159, at 229.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 282–83 (James Madison) (Filiquarian Publ’g ed., 2007).
See Kalyvas, supra note 159, at 237.
Id.
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freedom in its constitution, whereby its members are called jointly to be the authors
of their constitutional identity and to decide the higher rules and procedures that will
regulate their social and political lives.177 Such democratic founding of a state
justifies the higher status enjoyed by the higher “regulative principles” and central
institutions as they are products of a collective practice based upon conscious
political will-formation.178 The people are said to enjoy “political freedom” as they
are living under their own law and the constitution of the popular sovereignty.179 The
regime continues to be democratic so long as it responds to the will of the people,
who can continue to exercise collective autonomy and popular mobilization in
changing the constitutional order and affecting governmental policies.180 It continues
to enjoy democratic legitimacy when “the people is the subject of the constituent
power and gives itself its own constitution.”181 In a word, “[t]his constituent power
demands that those who are subject to a constitutional order co-institute it.”182 The
constitution is binding and valid if, and only if, it complies with the principles of
participation and inclusion.183 If a sovereign establishes a legal order or norms in the
exclusion of most or a substantive amount of its subjects, it would not be a
“constitution” or constituting act but an act of imposition, imposing the will of the
sovereign (as a ruling minority) on the people, without a genuine reflection of the
sovereign will of the people (the popular sovereignty).184 This forfeits its democratic
legitimacy, which will be in contravention to the constituent power.
IV. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, STATE, AND CONSTITUTION
An act of revolutionary disobedience is designed to demolish the existing “inauthority” by calling a halt to the authority relationship between the constituent and
constituted power, but it does and could revolutionize the constitution and fracture
the state: The constitution of the state could be fundamentally reconstructed as in the
American Revolution, and the state could split up into different states or units as in
the Indian Independence Movement.185 Questions arise as to how the state and
constitution are affected by such an act: Are the state and constitution necessarily
affected in the process of revolutionary disobedience, or is such effect merely
marginal and accidental? What do we mean by concepts such as the “constitution”
and the “state”? Does my emphasis on the distinction between government on the
one hand and the state on the other stand?

_________________________
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
(2004).

Id.
Id. at 238.
Id.
See id.
Kalyvas, supra note 159, at 238.
Id.
Id. at 238–39.
Id. at 239.
See A. U. SIDDIQUI, INDIAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN PRINCELY STATES OF VINDHYA PRADESH xiii
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A. What Is “the State”?
The state is an intrinsically complex and ambivalent concept. But most scholars
could point out that the government and state are two effectively distinct concepts,
both practically and theoretically, even though they disagree on the precise definition
of the state.186 Political scientists point out that the state and government run with
different logic.187 The conventional Weberian definition of the state as “a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory” comprises indivisible elements such as monopoly,
territory, legitimacy, and force,188 which are all constitutive of a state but are
dispensable for the government.189 A government, in the first place, is “a process of
regulating social behaviour.”190 From a historical and anthropological perspective, it
does function within a certain territory, but it does not necessarily claim the
monopoly of power.191 John Hoffman contends that the essence of government is
discussion, persuasion, and negotiation in order to preserve the fabric of the society
but not physical force.192 But the confusion does not melt away: Is the modern
government not claiming monopoly of legitimate physical force within the wider
state structure? Certainly the state is the territory that it occupies and the government
is only the office in that territory under the Weberian formula.193 In that sense they
are different, but is the government not claiming to speak on behalf of the state? Are
the two concepts truly distinguishable in the modern context? Is it meaningful to
make such distinction?
We need the juristic perspective to see a wholly different facet of the connotation
of the state. Revolutionary disobedience does not only occur in a case where the
people deny the authority of the particular government in power but also when they
approve the institutions and state structure. It occurs frequently with an aim of
rewriting the constitution or structure of the government or even that of the state. We
need to make sense of what it means by denying the authority of the government
instead of the state.
_________________________
186.
J.P Nettl, The State as a Conceptual Variable, in THE STATE: CRITICAL CONCEPTS 11 (John A. Hall ed.,
1994) (arguing that the state is “a collectivity that summates a set of functions and structures in order to generalize
their applicability” which must not be confused with “government”: The former lies in the structure and
institutionalization of power, whereas the latter is about political personal power); LAWRENCE KRADER, FORMATION
OF THE STATE 15–17, 22–28 (1968) (proposing from an anthropological perspective that there are societies with
governments but without the state, thus distinguishing the two); YALE H. FERGUSON & RICHARD W. MANSBACH,
THE State, CONCEPTUAL CHAOS, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 42, 57, 60–65 (1989)
(explicating the manifold meanings of the state: A normative order “for a particular society” and the norms and
beliefs that bind its people together, “a bureaucratic apparatus and institutionalized legal order in its totality,” a
sovereign amongst other sovereigns on the international forum etc., all qualities that allow us to distinguish it from
“the government”).
187.
JOHN HOFFMAN, BEYOND THE STATE 43 (1995).
188.
Max Weber, Legitimacy, Politics and the State, in LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 32, 33–34 (William
Connolly ed., 1984).
189.
HOFFMAN, supra note 187, at 42–43.
190.
Id. at 42.
191.
Id. at 43.
192.
See id. at 43–44.
193.
See Weber, supra note 188, at 33.
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As Martin Loughlin argues, the state is essentially a juristic concept.194 In
traditional German scholarship, the concept Staatslehre signifies three constituent
aspects of the state:
territory, ruling authority, and people.195 In the modern sense, the
state must also consist of a well-defined and independent territory,
ruling institutions, and subjects or citizens within that territory.196
Moreover, the state, as a juridical concept, signifies “the autonomy
of the political sphere” in which absolute authority lies.197 The
absolute authority, or sovereignty, is vested neither in the
government nor in the people but in the relationship itself.198 This
authority makes the state the sole source of law.199 The juristic
aspect of the state informs us that the state is “an abstract entity
above and distinct from both government and governed,” a selfsufficient political sphere.200 The government can be and is bound
by law, but no fundamental law can bind the state, as it possesses
the ultimate authority to change all law.201
However, the previously mentioned juristic conception of the state does not grant
us full access to understanding its existence in political reality. For this reason, an
ontological and metaphysical notion of the state is required. Instead of reading
features into the state here and there, the state itself is best understood as a scheme
of intelligibility.202 This means that the state can be reduced to a sum of
propositions.203 Conceiving all institutions as essentially ideas, Steinberger contends
that the state is an idea or a composite of ideas.204 It is the institution of institutions,
a structure of metaphysical commitment.205 A state can be reduced to such an
“intelligible core,” which constitutes its essence and has a certain ontological priority
to all other properties, such as its physical outlook.206 It is apparent that under such
understanding the government is only one instrumentality of the state, a part of the
larger structure.207 Steinberger adopts an analogy to expand on this, by looking at an
institution such as Harvard University.208 It is composed of students and staff
members, buildings and grounds, collections of documents, laboratory equipment,
_________________________
194.
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 114, at 196.
195.
Id. at 192.
196.
Id.
197.
Id. at 195.
198.
See id. at 186 (discussing a sophisticated analysis of the concept of sovereignty); MARTIN LOUGHLIN,
THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 83 (2003).
199.
LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 198, at 83.
200.
J. H. SHENNAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN EUROPEAN STATE 1450–1725, at 114 (1974).
201.
See HOFFMAN, supra note 187.
202.
PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE IDEA OF THE STATE 13 (2005).
203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 14.
205.
Id.
206.
Id. at 16.
207.
Id. at 15–16.
208.
STEINBERGER, supra note 202, at 17.
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and other things.209 It is currently located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, but if it
moved to somewhere else, we would not say that Harvard no longer exists but that
it simply moved.210 This suggests that those buildings and the place where they sit
are not essential. Harvard is essentially an idea, which confers meaning to its
component parts. Even though the state is constituted by ideas, however, it cannot
be reduced to that set of ideas, but it must be worked through “embodiment” by
which the ideas are set to work in the real world.211 There is no state- there are no
institutions- without embodiments.212 In fact, embodiment and ideas coexist in a
dialectical relationship: The embodiment realizes the idea and ultimately reshapes
it.213 After this intellectual exploration of the idea, we should come to understand
that we must specify what we mean by changing the state, given the complexity of
the concept. The state cannot be boiled down to any of its components: territory,
governing institutions, and the people.214 It is essentially a set of ideas and its
embodiment, and if so, the constitution of the state, composed of both norms and
practices, could be its constitutive ideas.215 It may make up the “intelligible core” of
the state.216
B. What Is “the Constitution”?
Constitutions are different from constitutional law as is the constitution of the
state different from the constitution of government. The formal constitution, or the
written constitution, strives to codify the fundamentals of the constitution of the
state, which can at best be incomplete. In contrast, the substantive constitution,
which is an absolute concept of the constitution, connotes the fundamental
constituents of the state. Therefore, understanding the “constitution” as
constitutional law or the written constitution is erroneous. The word constitution
hereinafter, if without specification, refers to the constitution of the state. The
existential concept of constitution refers to the foundations of the political unit,
which must be distinguished from the “constitution” of the office of government,
which are basically particularities regulating the governing institutions.217
Two polar conceptions of “constitution” are compared here. In Kelsen’s ideal
normativist conception, the constitution is a “unified, closed system of higher and
ultimate norms.”218 The theory reduces the state into a formal legal order, a system
_________________________
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 17–18.
211.
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 114, at 207. Loughlin criticizes that Steinberger’s
argument does not capture “the whole truth” as embodiment is also necessary to substantiate the ideas that the
institution embodies. But in fact Steinberger himself acknowledges that such embodiments are indispensable: “ideas
are governed by a ‘principle of necessary embodiment.’” See STEINBERGER, supra note 202, at 26.
212.
See CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 82–83 (1975).
213.
See STEINBERGER, supra note 202, at 26–27.
214.
See id. at 27.
215.
Id. at 16.
216.
Id.
217.
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 114, at 214.
218.
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 62.
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of norms that can be traced back to a basic norm, which underlies the system.219
Refusing the claim that the state, being entirely legalistic and constituting itself with
nothing else but norm, Schmitt argues that no closed constitutional system of norms
can create itself unless this unity derives from a “[pre-established], unified will.”220
Schmitt’s contention stresses that “the constitution originates from an act of will.”221
There are three facets of meaning of the constitution according to Schmitt.222
First, the constitution signifies “the concrete, collective condition of political unity
and social order of a particular state.”223 The state “does not have a constitution,
which forms itself and functions ‘according to’ a state will,” but rather “the state is
constitution, in other words, an actually present condition, a status of unity and
order.”224 The second meaning of the constitution regards it as an expression of a
concrete form of ordering, namely the relation of supremacy and subordination in
the state.225 Thereby, the constitution is a state form, and “the state is a constitution.
It is a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, council republic, and does not have merely
a monarchical or other type of constitution.”226 Third, the constitution is observed as
an active process wherein the people exert influence over it.227 The state is not just a
static existence but “simultaneously an entity that is always emerging.”228 This
account asserts “the principle of the dynamic emergence of political unity, of the
process of constantly renewed formation and emergence of this unity from a
fundamental or ultimately effective power and energy.”229 The constitution of the
state in this sense expresses “the free formation of the state will,” which incorporates
the people into the living body of state organism and “recognizes itself as the
personal unity of the will of all free personalities that is determined through selfmastery.”230
_________________________
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 114, at 211.
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 65.
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 114, at 212.
See SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 59–61.
Id. at 59.
Here I place the stress of words of Schmitt’s quote as Loughlin did in his work. See LOUGHLIN,
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 114, at 212. The term “order” here could be understood as “an actual
hierarchy of normative propositions of obligation” which endures as “a matter of fact.” Such “order” exists as a
result of practice. Herman Heller, The Nature and Structure of the State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1169–70. The
“order” could “ground the potential unit of the organization, its constancy as an effective unit of action in a
succession of all participants” and as such “the unit of the objectified order creates the structure of transmission
across time, even when all participants change over,” producing “the certainty of the persistence of the fabric of
conduct.” Id. at 1169.
A political rupture can be regarded as either the government acting in contravention of this political order of the
state and resulting in the people going against it or the constitution of the state does not live up to the present
expectations and will of the people wherein the government fails to line up the two as a mediator. In either case the
government is devoid of its function and the people have the right to legitimately forfeit its authorization.
225.
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 60.
226.
Id.
227.
Id. at 61.
228.
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW, supra note 114, at 213.
229.
Id. Unlike the two previous meanings, this third meaning of the constitution is more of a description of
how the state functions as well as its nature rather than a definition of what constitutes the state. It informs us of how
the state is instead of what the state is.
230.
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 62. Schmitt’s work, Constitutional Theory, is a
huge breakthrough from his earlier work, Political Theology, and therefore it is not necessary to read his earlier
concept of the “sovereign dictator” into the will-formation process here. As Heller puts it, “The unification of wills,
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Schmitt indeed offers us an immensely unique conception of the constitution of
the state. It primarily captures three aspects of its nature: the constitution as the
political unity of the state, the constitution as the state form, and the constitution as
an active will-formation process which is constantly renewing.231 What exactly
makes up the substantive constitution may be contestable, but the state must be
constitutive of such intelligible core: the constitution.232 Such “penumbra of doubt,”
as Steinberger contends, is relatively clear at the core but increasingly blurred at the
periphery.233 This could be discerned in the dispute over whether the federal structure
belongs to the most fundamental law of the German constitution of 1919.234 But in
fact the core of the constitution is relatively determinable.235 What does it inform us
about the nature of revolutionary disobedience? The act denies the authority of the
office of government, as the in-authority can no longer accord with the will of the
people.236They can simply request and order a change of the persons in office if their
only concerns are with the particular individuals in office and not the “constitution”
of the government or the state constitution. But if the latter are the main reasons for
the bringing down of the government, then the state is definitely involved. Even the
constitution of the office of government includes institutional reforms and may touch
at the intelligible core of the state.
Revolutionary disobedience is capable of revolutionizing the state. Invoking
Schmitt’s first existential meaning of the state,237 revolutionary disobedience can
fundamentally change the state by breaking its political unity and order, especially
if fundamentally different and incompatible ideas are introduced into its substantive
constitution: 238 for instance, by turning a non-religious state into a Christian state or
a wholly capitalist state into a social welfare state. In its second meaning, the state
can be revolutionized by changing its form, for instance from a monarchy to a
democracy.239 In the third meaning,240 the change of the state could not exist within
but without the constituted order. If it could take place within the constituted order,
it would not be revolutionary disobedience, but would fall into the broad definition
of revolution.241 The existing institutions and constituted order are incapable of
accommodating and responding to the dynamic emergence of will in the political
_________________________
by which the individually effective common will is established, is accomplished above all as an intrasubjective
process of integration and adjustment in each individual.” Heller, supra note 224, at 1170. This will result in a “Weconsciousness,” even though it may take generations to accomplish. Id. However, this does not have to be a
transcendent Rousseauian “general-will.” Id. “There could never be an organization, and never a state, without an
actual, even if in no way universal, community of wills.” Id.
231.
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 59–62.
232.
STEINBERGER, supra note 202, at 16.
233.
Id. at 253.
234.
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 20 (contending that the federal structure is the
most fundamental law of the German constitution of 1919 but failed to be codified as positive law).
235.
Heller, supra note 224, at 1213–15 (explaining the core of the Weimar Constitution is rather clear but
blurs out at the margin over interpretation).
236.
See id. at 1216.
237.
See SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 59.
238.
See id. at 60.
239.
Id.
240.
See id. at 61.
241.
See id. at 62.
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unit at present, and such failures force the people to suspend the instituted order in
order to reengage in the authorship of the fundamentals of the state.242
C. The Conditions of the State Under Revolutionary Disobedience:
Further Arguments
Revolutionary disobedience is capable of changing the constitutive principles of
the government and the constitution of the state. The territory and the institutions of
the state could be radically changed in the process, to the extent that the state
discontinues itself and becomes a new state.243 But since the state is a complex
composite, it could not be reduced to simply one of its components, and how far the
state changes must be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Having understood the nature of the state, even if the office of government is
brought down, the state still exists given the political order and unity are present,
unless the constitution of the state has been fundamentally and successfully
rewritten.244 As such, the state and the people find themselves in a “state of
exception,” a time when no distinction could be made between “legal” and “illegal,”
and otherwise “illegal” acts are extra-legal or supra-legal at this stage.245 There is an
emasculation and abnegation of the office of government, but dissolution of the state
need not take place.246 The state may have undergone a revolution and become a new
state, but its ancillary territory and people may remain intact.247 In a revolutionary
action, what matters the most is the change in the essence or constitution of the state
and its governing institutions, which signifies a fundamental departure from its
former logic of functionality and normativity, since the state is an idea.248 As shall
be discerned in the following sections, whether the constitution of the state has
experienced a fundamental change, and thus the birth of a new state has to be
compared with its former conditions, and ambiguity and contestability of marginal
cases are inevitable. A successful locus classicus of revolutionary disobedience,
namely the Indian Independence Movement will be the subject of study, where the
dissolution of the old state and the formation of the new one could be observed.
V. SOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC BOUNDARY PROBLEM: DEFINING THE DEMOS
Democracy literally means rule by the demos: the word for “the people” in
Greek.249 But the question of who should be deemed to make up the relevant demos
_________________________
242.
Id. at 61.
243.
See infra note 669.
244.
There is a largely unfounded fear that when the office of government is dissolved, the state also ceases
to exist and anarchy dawns. This is here proven to be wrong, and the government could easily be rebuilt under the
reformed constitution.
245.
See SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 134, at 80.
246.
See Kalyvas, supra note 159, at 227.
247.
See Weber, supra note 188, at 33.
248.
STEINBERGER, supra note, 202, at 14.
249.
Josiah Ober, The Original Meaning of “Democracy”: Capacity to Do Things, Not Majority Rule 2
(Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics, Version 1, 2007).
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or unit of people continues to perplex academics and becomes the center of debate.250
This is known to be the democratic boundary problem, drawing the line of where a
people rests as to be distinguished from other peoples.251 The ideas of constituent
power and popular sovereignty have been examined in previous sections, but they
inform us nothing about the proper unit of people. But the democratic boundary
problem is of profound importance as unless we can define who constitutes an
independent, distinguishable people, “the people” that we attempt to label could
potentially be an unbounded unit, taken to be, for instance, the people of the globe.
Arash Abizadeh’s thesis best illustrates this point, by submitting that the demos is in
principle unbounded and that “all those subjected to the exercise of political power”
should be included in the demos.252 Also, some scholars contend that democracy
itself stipulates nothing about the relevant unit but only serves as a political
procedure.253 In Hong Kong (“H.K.”), scholars are contesting how to define
“Hongkongers.”254 Sharing the pro tanto conviction that Hongkongers are a people,
the nationalist school of thought argues it to be a nation whilst the realist school
regards it as the citizens of the H.K. city-state.255 Given that the nation-state is widely
accepted, must we define a people as a nation? Are there any alternatives? Sir Ivor
Jennings has made the classic contention that “the people cannot decide until
someone decides who are the people” and that the definition of a people is
necessarily arbitrary.256 Is this an accurate assessment?
_________________________
250.
Most academics can identify the democratic problems and criticize the shortcomings of theories in the
field, but few of them could offer insightful solutions, leaving readers more perplexed than inspired. See Frederick
G. Whelan, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary Problem, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: NOMOS XXV 13,
16–42 (James R. Pennock et al. eds., 1983). His critical analysis serves as an excellent starting point to understand
the confusion that accompanies the democratic boundary problem, in which he offers a brief review to some of the
most common solutions that attempt to solve the problem: The all-affected principle, territorial states, consent
theory, nationalist theory, geographical features, etc. However, it opens questions without offering any answers.
The “all-affected” principle, proposing by democratic theorists such as Shapiro, stipulates that anyone whose interest
is affected by a decision should have a stake in its making. It is a failed attempt to solve the democratic problem.
See Sarah Song, The Boundary Problem in Democratic Theory, 4:1 INT’L THEORY 39, 40–42, 48–50 (2012)
(pointing out the excessively inclusionary character of “all-affected” principle and impossibility to decide whose
interests exactly are “affected,” instead arguing that the demos must be bounded by the state).
251.
See Song, supra note 250, at 48–50.
252.
See Arash Abizadeh, On the Demos and Its: Kin Nationalism, Democracy, and the Boundary Problem,
106 POL. SCI. REV., 867, 878 (2012). Abizadeh’s “unbounded demos” thesis or “all-subjected” principle is based
on the premise of state coercion: A person should have a right of say over political decisions when he is coerced by
the state, such as “direct physical force, invigilation via agents authorized to use physical force, and threats of
punitive harm—or to coercively undergirded symbolic processes of socialization and identity formation.” David
Miller offers an illuminating rebuttal. See David Miller, Democracy’s Domain, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 201, 218–25
(2009) (contending that being subjected to coercion does not automatically grant one a democratic say in the matter,
let alone being included in the demos).
253.
See Robert A. Dahl, Federalism and the Democratic Process, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 95, 103–
104 (John W. Chapman et al. eds., 1993).
254.
See BRIAN LEUNG (梁繼平) et al., XIANGGANG MINZU LUN (香港民族論) [HONG KONG NATIONAL
THEORY]; CHAN WIN (陳雲), XIANGGANG CHENGBANG LUN (香港城邦論) [HONG KONG CITY-STATE THEORY]
67, 79–85; Tim Hamlet, Could Hong Kong Ever Become A Nation State?, HONG KONG FREE PRESS (Aug. 29, 2016,
10:41 AM), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/08/29/could-hong-kong-ever-become-a-nation-state/; Suzzane
Sataline, Meet the Man Who Wants to Make Hong Kong a City-State, FOREIGN POLICY (May 18, 2015),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/hong-kong-china-protests-democracy-nativism/.
255.
See LUN, supra note 254.
256.
IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 56 (Cup Rev. ed., 2011).
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A. The Republican Theory of Democracy
In the above section, democracy is defined in accordance with the republican
theory as the collective authorship of the sovereign will.257 The value of selfdetermination and autonomy is central to democracy, which allows the relevant
demos to determine the laws that apply to themselves.258 As Kelsen puts it, people
could be said to enjoy “political freedom” if and only if they can participate in the
creation of the social order that regulates them, a process by which the individual
will of a person could be harmonized with the “collective will” via dialogue and
contestation.259 There must be a continual reconciliation and mediation between the
individual self-determination of particular citizens and collective selfdetermination.260 “If democracy requires that citizens experience their government
as their own, as representing them, they must experience the state as in some way
responsive to their own values and ideas.”261 Does such republican discourse of
democracy shed any light on the appropriate composition of the democratic unit
itself?
For the republican theory, a unit of people should possess the right sort of
qualities and attributes to make up a self-determining demos.262 If the relevant demos
lacks in solidarity owing to physical distance of the unit or cultural diversity, it may
fail to function.263 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) could elucidate
this point where Russia, as the dominant nation, often oppressed other smaller
nations which were unable to reconcile with the Russian-led policies, ultimately
leading to its dissolution.264
David Miller proposed four criteria that a demos should possess to be qualified
as a self-standing unit.265 The first criterion is sympathetic identification or mutual
identification.266 “Those who belong to the would-be demos must identify
sufficiently closely with the remainder of the group that they are motivated to try to
accommodate their interests and their convictions.”267 Even if they may not share the
same beliefs and interests on a specific issue, the people would be willing to attain
an agreement that everyone can accept to the possible extent.268 Such
accommodation goes beyond the recognition of human rights to reconciling one
another’s differences and needs.269 The second criterion is an underlying agreement
on moral principles, without which democratic deliberation would be impossible as
_________________________
257.
See Robert C. Post, Democracy and Equality, YALE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 24,
27–28, Paper 177 (2005).
258.
Id. at 25–26.
259.
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 286 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961).
260.
Post, supra note 257, at 27.
261.
Id.
262.
See STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
REPUBLICAN DELIBERATION 59 (2012).
263.
See id.
264.
See id. at 68–72.
265.
See Miller, supra note 252, at 208.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Id.
269.
Id.
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people would not accept nor respond to others’ arguments.270 The people must share
some basic convictions that the political community recognizes, which can resolve
disputes and spawn a fabric of consensus that brings the people together as a unit.271
The third requirement is interpersonal trust.272 This essentially means that the people
will have to abide by the rules of democracy, no matter winning or losing, without
which the democratic order will simply collapse.273 Finally, “the demos must be a
stable group whose members come together repeatedly over time to decide upon a
range of different issues.274 Stability is important because of its connection with
sincerity and trust.”275 Also, such decisions can serve as references in future
deliberation, and the people involved can be anticipated to act consistently.276
I contend that this final criterion could be important as the people then share a
common history under which agreement and consensus can be reached, without
which self-governance is impossible. For stability, it requires that the constituting
members of the demos remain largely the same over time and only change slowly,
which allows them to make concessions to one another and think in the long-run.
The desirable political unit must not be too small or too big, as a small village would
impend political deliberation due to familiarity and an empire would be unable to
accommodate politically and legally the difference in culture, beliefs, and other traits
as well as needs. Indeed, the nation-states, or alternatively, the city-states endorsed
by philosophers such as Rousseau and Montesquieu are possibly two ideal units of
demoi, which best align the individual and collective will-formation.277 The initial
establishment of a community, people, or even a state can be “arbitrary,” as Abizadeh
accuses it.278 But smaller political units can emerge within the larger entity over time
in the same manner as smaller units merge into larger ones.279 We need to determine
the suitable democratic unit on a case-by-case basis, judging with standards such as
“citizen effectiveness” (“citizens’ ability to control collectively the decisions of their
political system”) and “system capacity” (“the political system’s ability to
implement those decisions”).280 The people may have a clearly distinguishable will
different from the larger people, such as the Catalonian from the Spanish,
constituting a collective-self.281 A well-functioning, unified demos may be a primafacie reason not to change it whilst a fracturing one could legitimize the separation
of the relevant demoi. Democracy as well shows us how to draw one demos from

_________________________
270.
Id.
271.
Miller, supra note 252, at 208–10.
272.
Id. at 208.
273.
Id. at 209.
274.
Id.
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
See EMILE DURKHEIM, MONTESQUIEU AND ROUSSEAU: FORERUNNERS OF SOCIOLOGY (Ralph Manheim
trans., Univ. of Michigan Press, 1960) (1953).
278.
Abizadeh, supra note 252, at 877.
279.
See ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 110 (1973).
280.
Id.
281.
Id.
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another and requires the state to respond to its demands, the failure of which may
justify remedies such as further devolution or unilateral secession.282
B. Defining the Nation
In the modern era, with the wide acceptance of the nation-state, nations are the
predominant form of peoplehood and a nation is a people, even though a people need
not be a nation.283 Many philosophers see the dividing line between peoples as one
between nations, and accordingly we can draw the democratic boundary in line with
nationality.284 Theorists have provided an extensive number of justifications to
national self-determination.285 The purpose of this section, instead of repeating them
or offering new justifications, is to provide a definition for the nation so as to analyze
whether it could serve as the basis of a democratic unit.
First, there are objective criteria that define a nation and separate it from other
groups.286 The people as a nation embrace common features such as a shared history,
language, religion, and societal institutions, some or all of which combine in
different ways in each nation.287 A national society is necessarily imbedded with a
_________________________
282.
This Article concerns the ways of drawing the democratic boundary but leaves open the question of the
forms that the demos accommodates itself institutionally: the arrangement(s) of the state. Common forms of the state
include the unitary state, federal state, confederation, and an independent state (secession). Theoretically and in
practice, all of these state arrangements can accommodate for different demoi or nations, depending upon the fairness
of the division of power to the peoples and how reflective is the state in accommodating the wills of the different
demoi. To see how devolution within a unitary state can satisfy a sub-state people, see Stephen Tierney, Federalism
in a Unitary State: a Paradox too Far?, 19(2) REG’L & FED. STUD. 237, 245–249 (2009). The federal state and
confederation could also achieve such purpose. See Will Kymlicka, Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to Secession,
in THEORIES OF SECESSION 111, 112, 120, 124–127, 130–131 (Percy B. Lehning ed., 2005). Secession is the ultimate
form of state arrangement for a given people to exercise its collective right to self-determination. The right can only
be claimed when the demos have over time developed a legitimate right over the territory since secession is not only
a democratic arrangement for self-determination, but also a claim over territory. See Amandine Catala, Secession
and Annexation: The Case of Crimea, 16(3) GERMAN L. J. 582, 587–88, 598–99 (2005).
283.
STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM 35 (2006).
284.
See id.
285.
See Simon Caney, National Self-Determination and National Secession, in THEORIES OF SECESSION 151,
163–175 (Percy B. Lehning ed., rev. ed., 2005). Caney’s essay conveniently summarizes some major arguments and
writings that attempt to justify national self-determination and contributes his own line of reasoning. (P1) “Political
institutions that further people’s well-being are pro tanto valuable”; (P2) “An individual’s membership of a nation
furthers his or her well-being”; and (P3) “A nation-state can best further a nation’s practices and culture,” therefore
(C) “National self-determination is, ceteris paribus, valuable.” See, e.g., Daniel Philpott, In Defense of SelfDetermination, 105(2) ETHICS 352, 366 (1995). Note that self-determination, albeit justified, itself does not prescribe
the form that it takes, which could be devolution, federalism, secession, etc. Compare Avishai Margalit & Joseph
Raz, National Self-Determination, J. PHIL. 439, 449 (1999) arguing that national self-determination is only
instrumentally justified and should be a qualified right), with Daniel Philpott, Self-Determination in Practice, in
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 81 (Margaret Moore ed., 1998) (contending that selfdetermination is intrinsically valuable for the promotion of autonomy, which furthers self-government and identitypreservation). Moreover, given the purpose that it serves, note that the right to self-determination under Philpott’s
conception is not limited to nations but to any groups which share a common identity, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or
otherwise, and determine to shape their fate together. Nations are only but one of the groups that enjoy such
entitlement.
286.
TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM, supra note 283, at 34–35.
287.
Id. It is worth stressing here that the above criteria that define the nation based on common political
values falls in the category of civic nationalism, which must be distinguished from ethnic nationalism that defines
the nation with biological characteristics such as race, colour, and ethnicity. The latter is exclusivist and a dangerous
ideology. See BELL, supra note 26, at 7.
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“societal culture . . . which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across
the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious,
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.”288
This also contributes to members of the nation a common societal identity, which
they use in part to define themselves.289 Second, there are subjective features of a
nation that define it as a distinct collective entity.290 For the nation to exist, its
members must feel a subjective sense of belonging, which makes them desire to
preserve the group’s distinctiveness and to seek better political and legal
accommodation of it.291 “Defining a political entity as a national community is only
justified if a substantial majority of its citizens has consented to this definition,” as
Yael Tamir powerfully contends.292 The existence of a national consciousness is the
only factor that “is necessary, although not sufficient for a group to be defined as a
nation.”293 Tamir’s discourse bears resemblance to Benedict Anderson’s concept of
“imagine communities,” which argues the nation is a community dependent on its
members’ capacity to “imagine the nation.”294 Most people would not have met the
vast majority of their nationals, and the nation could only survive upon the belief of
its members that they all share national characteristics.295 But such subjective sense
of common identity, albeit significant, must be built on the objective traits that the
nation shares.296 In fact, the objective and subjective elements of national identity
are entangled and mutually dependent: The objective characteristics are themselves
shaped and re-shaped through the group’s self-consciousness.297 As some may find
surprising, there is no definitive one-size-fits-all classification of a nation under civic
nationalism theories, and theoretically any group of people with a set of common
objective traits can become a nation so long as they regard themselves as one.298 This
indeed allows room for nation-building where a sufficient amount of a territoriallyconcentrated people see themselves as a distinct collective identity and opt for
separating from the larger people.299 Due to the indeterminate nature of the concept
“nation,” it could be employed just as the republican democratic theory to establish
the democratic boundary, where for instance the people as a collective have suffered
historical injustice or find their will systematically incompatible with the larger unit
or simply ignored.300
_________________________
288.
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 76 (1995).
289.
See TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM, supra note 283.
290.
See id.
291.
Id. at 40–41.
292.
YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 158 (1993).
293.
Id. at 65.
294.
TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM, supra note 283, at 42–43.
295.
Id. at 43.
296.
Id. at 42.
297.
Id.
298.
See id.
299.
A consequent worry from this is that there may be an endless trend of creation of nations, which
academics call the “infinite regression problem.” But as Kymlicka forcefully argues, “I do not think that we will see
a never-ending procession of groups declaring themselves to be ‘nations.’” Will Kymlicka & Ruth Rubio. Marin,
Liberalism and Minority Rights: An Interview, 12(2) RATIO JURIS 133, 141 (1999). “It is important to remember
that there are costs, as well as benefits, to adopting a nationalist stance.” Id.
300.
See TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM, supra note 283.
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But for a nation to be autonomous, two extra criteria should be fulfilled, namely
territorial concentration and the potential for self-government.301 It would be a virtual
impossibility for a dispersed nation over different territories to practice self-rule if
and when it becomes a minority in those segregated locations instead of being the
majority or the whole over one spot.302 The Londoners, as the absolute or qualified
majority in London, can be self-governing, but it turns impossible when they are
scattered across Southampton, Manchester, and Edinburgh, where they become the
minority in each of those districts.303 Territorial scatter also renders a common
national identity highly improbable, which is likely to produce a loose bonding as
common language and culture requires territorial proximity.304 As to the potential for
self-government, it is practically important as it signifies the capacity of a group to
pursue its own agenda. For Stephen Tierney, such criterion is important since
potentially self-governing sub-state nations within plurinational states, as fully
functioning demoi, could make a compelling case to require an equal status with the
host state.305 But it should be noted that the potential of self-government for a nation
can be highly contestable, which is empirical and not normative.306 The potential of
self-governance should be an extra force, but not a dominating one, in a nation’s
claim for self-determination.307 The real significance of such potential, I argue, lies
in the fact that if a nation’s self-government, however limited in extent, has been
institutionalized, legally or constitutionally, it easily serves as a springboard for
complete self-rule. These self-standing institutions, as will be contended below, can
serve to define who the people are and disrupt the constitutional order between the
sub-state nations and the larger state. A sub-state national society which embraces a
territorially concentrated and historically settled population with “an elaborate set of
social, cultural and, in some cases, governmental networks and institutions” makes
not only self-government possible, as Tierney argues, but also independence and
secession.308
C. “The People” as Process: An Ontological Grounding
The democratic boundary can be drawn according to a self-perceived demos, a
nation, and even potentially any territorially concentrated groups when constitutional
accommodation fails them. Accordingly, we might say that any of these units
constitute a people, in the sense of a people within the purported boundary. But the
_________________________
301.
Territorial concentration is in fact a precondition of any units to exercise self-determination and for
secession to be possible, a premise that also holds true for the republican democratic theory to draw the line of a
demos.
302.
See id.
303.
Id.
304.
AZAR GAT, NATIONS: THE LONG HISTORY AND DEEP ROOTS OF POLITICAL ETHNICITY AND
NATIONALISM 24–25 (2012).
305.
TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM, supra note 283, at 38.
306.
See id.
307.
See id.
308.
Id. at 33.
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perplexity runs deeper.309 Is the people, then, a collection of individuals? Are they
capable of having the Rousseauian sense of a unified will? And how do we know or
how could we ascertain whether the people have “spoken” or decided on a specific
question?
Constitutional jurist Bruce Ackerman developed his dualist democratic theory in
an attempt to answer this question, by which he seeks to ascertain what decisions the
people have made at a specific time in the American history.310 His theory sees the
people as a process instead of an aggregate of individuals, which allows us to see its
true nature as the people could not have a “unified will” fixed in time, either in the
past or future, because there are always dissenters.311 It also avoids the requirement
of a unified consent at any given time, the lack of which may disqualify the
legitimacy of the people if a theory hinges upon the image of a unified people, and
as such any withdrawal of consent makes the people no more than those who
consented.312 In Ackerman’s discourse, the people is “an extended process of
interaction between political elites and ordinary citizens.”313 The people exercises
popular sovereignty to authorize higher law-making, and the government responds
through institutional actions and judicial decisions to consolidate the higher status of
the popular will.314 Because the people is a process, there can be a range of
constitutional moments without the need of a unified will at any given time.315 But
in Ackerman’s theory, the people is a closed process, one “that finishes after it
speaks.”316 It consists of distinct periods of mobilization, each of which requires
closure to be able to determine what the people has said.317 This closure necessitates
the need for a decisive sovereign will, a sovereign decision that is responsive to the
unified voice of the people, which comes with clear beginnings and ends.318
Ackerman’s theory is only value when the people’s voice is registered as the
sovereign will, with the institutions being successfully transformed by their
actions.319 For revolutionary disobedience, a successful instance necessarily registers
_________________________
309.
The question of who “the people” is and the contemporary debate is introduced by Margaret Canovan,
The People, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY 349, 353–57 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2008).
The doubt and the mystification of “the people” have also been extensively addressed in her other work. See
MARGARET CANOVAN, THE PEOPLE (2005).
310.
Ackerman’s theory of dualism will be more extensively addressed in Part VII.
311.
See ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 119, 136.
312.
See e.g., Sofia Nasstrom, The Legitimacy of the People, 35(5) POL. THEORY 624, 625–26, 628–30 (2007).
313.
2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATION 187 (1998).
314.
A successful constitutional moment contains four phases: Signaling, proposing, deliberating and
consolidating. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–67 (1993).
315.
See ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 127.
316.
See id.
317.
Id. at 127, 132–33.
318.
Id. at 132.
319.
Paulina Espejo criticizes dualist democracy discourse as not fully embracive of process, as we can learn
how the people rule without the need for their consensus at a given moment as Ackerman idealizes. See id. at 132,
134. What Ackerman narrates and theorizes is in fact a fragment of a larger picture: Whilst he requires that the
people “have one voice at a given time,” he ignores the fact that it is more about the will of the interpreter, be it the
government or judiciary, or that of the scholar. Id. But it is more accurately depicted as the registered will of the
people or the constitutional decision of that time. We cannot ignore the fact that there are other people who voice
their disagreement during these times and arbitrarily take them out of the concept of the people, however small in
number.
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the relevant political actions as the people’s will, which also defines who the people
is.320
Nonetheless, Ackerman’s people as procedural process is not encompassing
enough, as it could at most only ascertain what the people has spoken when its voice
is registered institutionally. Here, Paulina Espejo’s fully-fledged processual theory
is introduced.321 She contends that a people as process should be understood as “an
unfolding series of events coordinated by the practices of constituting, governing,
and changing a set of institutions. These institutions are the highest authority for all
those individuals intensely affected by these events and these institutions.”322 Where
there is government or the state, there are authoritative institutions.323 These
institutions define who the people as a collective is, and changing them redefines the
people.324 The people is constituted by events rather than individuals, but not any
events.325 Only political events or “people events” are constitutive of a people, which
are events “coordinated by the practices of constituting, governing, or changing the
institutions… [that] are the highest authority for all those individuals intensely
affected…by these institutions...”326 With reference to this view, for instance, the
cession of Hong Kong to the British Empire in 1842 (changing the sovereign), a
fully-elected Legislative Council introduced by Governor Chris Pattern in 1990s,
and later China’s replacement of the fully elected legislature with a half elected
mechanism are all political events that make up the Hong Kong people.327
This theory also allows us to distinguish different peoples. Espejo specifies three
conditions to achieve this, none of which alone is sufficient to individuate a
people.328 Those include: (1) “the time and place in which the process occurs,” (2)
“the character of the practices that constitute, govern, or change a particular set of
supremely authoritative institutions,” and (3) “whether the individuals who are under
the authority of the process’s authoritative institutions conceive of themselves as part
of different peoples.”329 The first condition allows us to distinguish a people from
others with its peculiar spatio-temporal expanse.330 By way of illustration, the
modern Hong Kong people refers to the population spreading across the Hong Kong
Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories from the 19th century.331 For
the second criterion, a people is developed through repeated events which form a
_________________________
320.
See ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 132, 134.
321.
Id. at 137.
322.
Id. at 134. The word “coordination” here is used to describe how the people as a process operate. A
people event manifests itself when it is directly related to the constituting, governing, or changing of the highest
institutions concerned, such as an election. But before the actual voting with a ballot box or the counting of votes, a
person watching presidential candidates’ debates and co-workers exchanging political opinions in the office, where
relevant, coordinate to form part of the process. So the people as a process are coordinated by political events.
323.
Id.
324.
See id.
325.
See id.
326.
ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 157–58, 168–69.
327.
See id.
328.
Id. at 162.
329.
Id.
330.
Id. at 163.
331.
See id.
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character to the series of occurrences.332 There are various –forms of manifestation
of such character; for instance, both 20th century Britain and 19th century Japan
practiced traditions of enthroning the monarch, but the English monarch is anointed
by the Archbishop of Canterbury and vested in a garb of alb, dalmatic, and stole
whilst the ancient Japanese “ceremony of ascending the throne and announcing the
succession to the gods of heaven and earth, to the spirits of the imperial ancestors.”333
Both practices are apparently distinguishable. Hence, the repetition of characteristic
practices allows us to differentiate peoples by their traits, which is partly determined
by past events and partly self-creative.334 “A people’s governing practices have a
causal history, which partially determines what the people will do in the future.”335
They condition the way a people will change. Despite this, there is still room for
indeterminacy in such a process, where self-creation is possible for the people to
determine its character. The final criterion explicates how a people’s self-perception
plays a role in its self-definition.336 When the individuals who engage in people
events regard themselves as a particular people, they may preserve its characteristics
to maintain the status quo, or join a larger people if they share the same traits, or
segregate themselves from the existing unit and create a new one.337 “In this manner
different peoples can fuse into one if individuals partaking of different peoples
believe they have merged and choose to harmonize their practices of constituting,
governing, and changing authoritative institutions. The converse occurs in cases of
independence, secession, and partition.”338
In spite of the ability of the above theories to solve the democratic boundary
problems, a word of caution should be noted. Indeed, we can distinguish one people
from another with reasonable judgment in most cases based on the bulk of the
people’s character, but the distinction of peoples may get blurred in the border areas,
which leads to the indeterminacy problem of drawing a fine line of separation
between territories. Where this occurs, the implementation of self-determination
mechanisms within a unitary state, a federal state, or even confederation may be
better and more agreeable than secession. As noted by Espejo, if we treat people as
a process, peoples are defined by different major events in specific territories and
can accordingly be individuated.339 For instance, the American people can be
distinguished from the Mexican people, especially at the heart of the two countries,
such as Washington, D.C. and Mexico City, where there are significant cultural,
political, and institutional differences.340 Also, in these areas, the people events of
the two are entirely separated.341 But the two peoples are harder to disentangle at the
U.S.-Mexico border area where political mechanisms bear resemblance.342 This just
_________________________
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 163.
Id.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id.
ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 165.
See id. at 162.
Id. at 166–67.
Id. at 166.
Id.
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illustrates the difficulty in separating borders and the indeterminacy that occurrences
between peoples may overlap at the periphery. It does not warrant the conclusion,
however, that the two peoples have thus merged, because the bulk of them is still
markedly distinguishable and different.
D. Drawing the Democratic Boundary in Practice: Are Hongkongers a
People? A Case Study
With the theoretical analysis above, it would make a strong case to contend that
the Hongkongers are a distinct people, sharply distinguishable from the “Chinese
people,” i.e., the citizens or inhabitants of China.343 The conviction that Hongkongers
are a people is vitally important to justify its self-determination and to understand
the appeal of the Umbrella Movement, which is the subject of Part VIII.344
Employing the republican democratic theory, Hong Kong as a geographical space
and its political institutions best allow the Hongkongers to engage in political
participation in expressing their individual wills and the determination of their
sovereign will, as the people have been co-existing peacefully across the H.K. Island,
Kowloon, and the New Territories since 1842, and they have developed a sui generis
sense of belonging and identity to H.K.345 Institutionally speaking, H.K.’s political
and legal institutions, albeit undemocratic and imperfect, are by far the better option
as compared to being absorbed into and engulfed by the Chinese Constitution, which
is categorically incapable of accommodating regional and national differences, with
the authorities failing to protect the constitutional rights of the Chinese people and
systematically violating their human rights, such as the freedom of expression, which
is the absolutely irreducible core of democracy and the formation of people’s will.346
Applying the nationalist thesis in a similar manner defines Hong Kong as a self-

_________________________
343.
Chinese could be defined as an ethnicity or the “native or inhabitant of China.” See OXFORD UNIV. PRESS,
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Angus Stevenson, 3d ed. 2015). “Chinese people” should follow the latter
definition if we take it to mean a nation instead of a race, adopting civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism.
344.
The task of this paragraph is to distinguish the Hongkongers from the “Chinese people” or the so-called
“Chinese mainlanders,” which are two entities that are most often mingled or confused to be one people, due to the
legal sovereignty that China is exercising over Hong Kong.
345.
The latest poll pertaining identity conducted by the University of Hong Kong presents that an
overwhelming 40.2% of Hong Kong people regard themselves as “Hongkonger(s)” whilst only 18.1% consider
themselves “Chinese.” Some people, on the other hand, see themselves with a mixed identity, with 27.4% seeing
themselves as “Hongkongers in China” and 13.0% regarding themselves as “Chinese in Hong Kong.” It is reasonable
to say that the majority of Hongkongers see themselves as a distinct entity from other Chinese people. See UNIV.
H.K.,
Table,
PUBLIC
OPINION
PROGRAMME,
https://www.hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2017).
346.
China’s oppression of freedom of expression and suppression of cultural difference against sub-state
nations such as Tibet and Xinjiang are blatant, which do not enjoy constitutional protection such as that of H.K.
under the “one-country, two-systems” guarantee. See Barry Sautman, “Cultural Genocide” and Tibet, 38 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 173, 219–25 (2003); see also Matthew Moneyhon, Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New
Frontier”, 3(1) ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 120, 129–34 (2002).
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sufficient unit. Given a shared history, language,347 and societal institutions,348 as
well as other cultural forms and attributes,349 Hongkongers are a distinct people, who
are clearly separable from their Chinese neighbor. Due to these unique features that
the Hong Kong people share, Hong Kong is potentially a candidate for becoming a
nation, even though it is too soon at this stage to conclude that it is already a nation
owing to the lack of such self-consciousness.350 For Hong Kong to truly become a
nation, a process of nation-building is required but is currently missing.351
If we are to apply the processual theory of people, Hongkongers as a distinct
people are even more obvious, being markedly distinguishable from other peoples
including their geographical neighbors, the “Chinese mainlanders.”352 First, the
spatio-temporal expanse that Hongkongers find themselves in is markedly different
than that of the Chinese mainlanders.353 Not only do Hongkongers and Chinese
mainlanders occupy different geographical spaces, with the former in H.K. and the
latter in China, they are also defined by discrete historical timelines.354
The modern Hong Kong city-state is defined by moments, such as the British
occupation of Hong Kong Island in 1842,355 the cession of Kowloon Peninsula in
1860,356 and a ninety-nine year lease of the New Territories in 1898.357 In contrast,
the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 as a country.358 The timeline
of political events that make up the H.K. and Chinese people are clearly different.
Even in 1997, the legal sovereignty over H.K. was transferred from Britain to China
with the promulgation of the Hong Kong Basic Law.359 H.K. was “an inalienable
part of the People’s Republic of China,” and the Standing Committee of National
People’s Congress of China (“NPCSC”) had ultimate authority over the amendment
_________________________
347.
Hongkongers commonly use Cantonese as their first language, in contrast to the Chinese people who
commonly use Putonghua. Also, the H.K. Basic Law stipulates H.K.’s official languages to be both Chinese and
English, whereas in China the official language is only Chinese. See XIANGGANG JIBEN FA, art. 9 (H.K.) [hereinafter
Basic Law]. Moreover, traditional Chinese characters are commonly employed and used officially whereas
simplified Chinese enjoys widespread usage and is used officially in China.
348.
For instance, under Article 106 of the Basic Law, H.K. “shall have independent finances” and the Chinese
government does not levy tax in H.K.; under Article 111, H.K. has its own currency; and Articles 17, 43 and 82
entitle H.K. to have its own legislature, executive, and judiciary respectively, which constitute the highest authorities
in the region.
349.
H.K.’s cultural distinctiveness is most commonly delineated as the hybrid of Chinese and Western
culture. It is a bilingual society, and its unique mixed culture is most typically reflected in its food such as H.K. style
milk tea, egg tarts, and egg waffles. It has its distinct film and music culture, which are reflected in Bruce Lee’s
Kung-Fu movies and Canto-pop. See also Cao Xiaonuo (曹曉諾), Xianggang Ren de Beihou Shi Zhengge Wenhua
Tixi (“香港人”的背後是整個文化體系), UNDERGRAD (學苑), Feb. 2014, at 31–33; see generally XU CHENGEN
(徐承恩), YUZAO DE CHENGBANG (鬱躁的城邦: 香港民族源流史) [The City-state of Distress and Anguish: A
History of the Hong Kong Nation] (2014).
350.
See HONG KONG JOURNAL, http://www.hkjournal.org/timeline/index.html.
351.
See id.
352.
See id.
353.
Id.
354.
See id.
355.
Id.
356.
HONG KONG JOURNAL, supra note 350.
357.
Id.
358.
The Chinese Revolution of 1949, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/19451952/chinese-rev.
359.
Basic Law, supra note 347, at 1.
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and interpretation of the Basic Law itself.360 It could be said that one of the “people’s
events” of both H.K. and China had merged and the edge of difference between the
two peoples became slightly blurred.361 Due to the “one country, two systems” legal
entrenchment, the timeline between the two could still be markedly distinguished.362
The highest institutions of the two places are also entirely separable, with H.K.
having its own executive authorities, legislature, and independent judiciary being the
highest institutions of the land.363 Second, institutionally speaking, “the character[s]
of the practices that constitute, govern, or change a particular set of supremely
authoritative institutions” of Hong Kong and China are entirely different.364 The
authoritative constitutional instrument in Hong Kong is the Hong Kong Basic Law,
whilst in China it is the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.365 The former
institutionalized the separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and
judiciary,366 which ensures judicial independence and the rule of law;367 the latter
does not practice such separation of powers and is not bound by the rule of law.368
The former practices a quasi-democratic system and free market capitalist system;369
the latter practices the absolute rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which is

_________________________
360.
Id. art. 2.
361.
See HONG KONG JOURNAL, supra note 350.
362.
See id.
363.
See Basic Law, supra note 347, art. 2 (H.K.). One may argue that the National People’s Congressional
power of interpretation and amendment of the Basic Law as well as the Chief Executive of H.K. being held
accountable to the Central People’s Government, apart from the H.K. Special Administrative Region, blurred the
difference between the H.K. and Chinese people. But I contend that the timeline of political events of the two
overlapped in 1997 and thereafter, but such intersection is not overwhelming enough to overcome the past timeline
of the two entities nor to blur their institutional differences and distinguishable characters. The European Court of
Justice has overriding legal authority on European Union Law over both the U.K. and Germany, but this does not
make the two people and countries indistinguishable from each other. Likewise, the Chinese authority’s supreme
power over certain issues such as the interpretation of the Basic Law does not make the two people indistinguishable.
364.
ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 162; see generally Basic Law, supra note 347 (outlining Hong Kong laws as
a territory of China).
365.
Constitution, THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm; see generally Basic Law, supra note 347 (outlining
Hong Kong laws as a territory of China).
366.
DANNY GITTINGS, INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW 103–06 (2013).
367.
Basic Law, supra note 347, art. 85 (H.K.).
368.
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 13–14 (2002) (criticizing the
Chinese courts’ lack of independence and authority due to the Communist Party’s power of approval of senior
judges, judicial corruption, and the practice of judges meeting ex parte with litigants and lawyers, which undermines
fairness and impartiality).
369.
Basic Law, supra note 347, Annex II Instrument 4 (H.K.) (stipulating that for H.K.’s legislature, half of
its members are directly elected according to geographical constituencies composed of all H.K. citizens whilst the
other half are elected by functional constituencies made up of a small group of eligible voters). Basic Law, supra
note 347, art. 5 (H.K.) (ensuring that “[t]he socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50
years.”).
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undemocratic,370 and the Constitution prescribes it to be a socialist state.371 Finally,
beside these institutional differences, the majority of Hong Kong people regards
itself as a distinct entity different from the Chinese people.372 It is fair to conclude
that, in light of the three criteria of the people as process, Hongkongers are an
independent demos, a people.
VI. THE LOCUS CLASSICUS OF REVOLUTIONARY DISOBEDIENCE: THE INDIAN
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
In this Part, the revolutionary nature of the Indian Independence Movement
(“Movement”) will be examined. The Movement led India to obtain power of selfdetermination and democracy gradually, or swaraj (self-ruling), and ultimately led
to India’s complete independence from the British Crown.373 Indeed, the Movement
owes its success to many forms of political revolt, such as civil resistance, civil
disobedience, non-cooperation, strike, fast, walk-out, hartal, etc.374 But these are
only fragmented forms of political actions that see the bits and pieces of the
Movement without seeing the larger whole and the fundament, namely its
revolutionary disobedient character. The Indian Independence Movement, which
strove for autonomy and self-rule for India, generally ran from 1919 to 1947.375 But
our focus on the Movement will be broken down into three phases, that of 1919 to
1922, 1927 to 1932, and 1939 to 1942. The first two phases made up what I shall
name the inchoate or rudimentary stage of the revolutionary disobedience, and the
last phase composes its final and conclusive stage, which needs to be analyzed
separately.
A. The Movement in Its First and Second Phases: From 1919 to 1932
The Gandhian political wave unveiled upon the return of Mahatma Gandhi to
India in 1915.376 But not until 1919 did Gandhi launch his first act of political
_________________________
370.
See MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY 15–17,
19–21 (1st ed. 2006). Despite Article 1 of the Constitution that prescribes China to be “a people’s democratic state,”
this is far from the truth. The Chinese Community Party (CCP) is de facto inseparable from the state and voice on
behalf of the state. Notwithstanding that the National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest legislative authority,
it rarely imposes restrictions on CCP’s policies or deters them from being passed into law, incapacitating its
constitutional oversight power over the CCP. Most notably, members of both the NPC and the Local People’s
Congress, the highest authority in a sub-state region, are not directly elected via competitive elections. Also, the
CCP’s suppression of freedom of expression on politics further stifles deliberation, the very foundation of
democracy.
371.
See XIANFA art. 4 (2004) (China) (noting that China sets “the building of a socialist society” its objective
and makes it a constitutional entrenchment).
372.
Annalisa Merelli, These Illustrations Show How Different Hong Kong Thinks It Is from Mainland China,
QUARTZ (July 1, 2015), https://qz.com/442887/how-hong-kong-is-different-from-china-in-a-series-of-offensivestereotype-based-posters/.
373.
Lester R. Kurtz, The Indian Independence Struggle (1930–1931), INTERNATIONAL CENTER ON
NONVIOLENT CONFLICT 1 (2009).
374.
BONDURANT, supra note 28, at 36 (stating that Hartal means “[v]oluntary closing of shops and
businesses”).
375.
Kurtz, supra note 373, at 3.
376.
See ANTONY COPLEY, GANDHI AGAINST THE TIDE 29 (1987).
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disobedience against the Rowlatt Bills, which gave the British Raj power of arbitrary
arrest and detention without trial.377 In the eyes of Gandhi, such acts of disobedience
were only part of his larger political theory, namely satyagraha, which literally
means “holding fast to truth” by taking different forms of political actions such as
civil disobedience and resistance.378 The gathering in Jallianwalla Bagh against the
Bills led to the infamous killing of 379 and wounding of 1,200 of the crowd by the
British troops.379 The incident led Gandhi to launch his nationwide swaraj movement
in 1920 in order to obtain self-rule, to “maintain our separate existence without the
presence of the English,” given the undemocratic constitutional arrangements.380
“[S]waraj in one year,” Gandhi promised his followers.381 He asked Indians to
withdraw support from the Raj at multi-levels: the civil service, the law courts,
government schools, and the newly established legislative councils.382 The impact of
the call on the civil service was the most insignificant with only a few civil servants
resigning, but people from other sectors favorably responded with many lawyers
ceasing to practice law and many students striking against government schools.383
During the same year in 1921, the Prince of Wales arrived in India for his state visit,
but the Indian National Congress launched a national hartal and called for boycott
of all ceremonies that the Prince would attend.384 Riots had eventuated with the
satyagrahis outlawed.385 However, “[n]one of the accused defended themselves in
court, because a defence would have implied acknowledging the court’s
jurisdiction.”386 By 1922, Gandhi launched a mass civil disobedience movement,
breaking the law by declining to pay tax in Bardoli.387 “Mass civil disobedience is
like an earthquake,” stressed Gandhi.388 “Where the reign of mass civil disobedience
begins, there the subsisting Government ceases to function. . . . The police stations,
the court offices, etc., all shall cease to be the Government property and shall be
taken charge of by the people.”389 Gandhi was eventually imprisoned in 1922, which
could be seen as marking the end of the first phase of his disobedient movement, but
the new Government of India Act that was implemented in 1921 introduced more
democratic elements into the central legislature.390

_________________________
377.
Id. at 42.
378.
Maya Chadda, Satyagraha: Gandhi’s Approach to Peacemaking, BOMBAY SARVODAYA MANDAL &
GANDHI RES. FOUND., http://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/satyagraha1.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).
379.
COPLEY, supra note 376, at 42. (“On 13 April 1919 some 10,000 . . . unarmed Indians had gathered in
Amritsar in an enclosed space, known as the Jallianwalla Bagh.”).
380.
STANLEY WOLPERT, A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA 304 (2d ed. 1982).
381.
Id.
382.
COPLEY, supra note 376, at 43–44.
383.
Id. at 44.
384.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 305.
385.
Id. at 306.
386.
GEOFFREY ASHE, GANDHI: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 226 (1968).
387.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 306.
388.
Id.
389.
Id.
390.
See id. at 307–08 (demonstrating the new democratic elements introduced to the Central Legislative
Council).
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But due to the insufficient democratic nature of the legislatures, self-rule was
still severely restricted with widespread poverty problems facing Indians.391 The
Round Table Conference failed to reach a democratic pact for India.392 Upon
rejection of the dominion status of India in 1929, the Indians’ demand had been
transformed from swaraj as self-rule to purna swaraj as complete independence.393
The Congress passed an independence resolution and in 1930, Gandhi proclaimed
January 26 as “Independence Day.”394 “The object of our non-violent movement is
complete independence for India,” which “means nothing more or less than getting
out of alien control,” remarked Gandhi.395 As the inauguration of the second wave
of satyagraha, Gandhi launched his famous salt march.396 The onerous salt tax
imposed by the British Raj posed an extremely heavy burden on the lives of the
Indian masses, and therefore, Gandhi chose it as a measure to challenge and deprive
the authority of the British.397 Gandhi led his chosen satyagrahis to the Dandi seashore to breach the Salt Acts by picking up salt themselves.398 He urged all Indians
to manufacture salt and take the natural salt found at the seashore by themselves.399
The satyagraha was widely echoed across India by the public with countless
peasants breaking the Salt Laws.400 At least 60,000 Indians were imprisoned
accordingly.401 A paralyzing effect dawned on the government with the Congress
Committee extending the scope of movement to include the violation of forest laws,
the refusal of tax payment in ryotwari areas, and the boycott of foreign cloth, banks,
shipping, and insurance companies.402 The whole idea of the Salt Satyagraha was,
in Gandhi’s words, “nothing less than to cause a complete paralysis of the
administrative machinery.”403 Gandhi was eventually arrested on May 4, 1930.404
Upon Gandhi’s release in 1931, the Viceroy Irwin offered another Round Table
Conference (“Conference”) to Gandhi and other members of Congress, during which
Irwin made concessions such as allowing salt collection for domestic purposes.405
The idea of dialogue is central to Gandhi’s satyagraha, but the Conference failed to
be a progressive dialogue for India’s democratic reform.406 The Government of India
Act of 1935, produced by the Raj, bore little resemblance to the conclusions made at
the Conference, under which the Raj reserved many important powers for itself.407
_________________________
391.
Id. at 314.
392.
Id.
393.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 314; see also B. R. NANDA, MAHATMA GANDHI: A BIOGRAPHY 288 (1958).
394.
NANDA, supra note 393, at 290.
395.
COPLEY, supra note 376, at 31.
396.
Salt March, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Salt-March (last visited
Mar. 8, 2017).
397.
COPLEY, supra note 376, at 46.
398.
Salt March, supra note 396.
399.
Id.
400.
Id.
401.
Id.
402.
BONDURANT, supra note 28, at 96, 101.
403.
Id. at 89.
404.
COPLEY, supra note 376, at 47 (“[Gandhi’s] decision to invade a salt works on 24 April led to his arrest
on the night of 4/5 May 1930.”).
405.
Id. at 47–48.
406.
Id. at 47.
407.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 322.
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Despite the fact that only less than half of the provincial legislative seats across India
were open to nationwide elections, members of Congress won all of them.408
Moreover, Congress candidates had won other electorate contests, which gave them
70% of the total popular vote.409 This symbolized that the Congress was projecting
the voice of the Indian people and that the Indians demanded complete independence
from the British.
B. The Movement in Its Final Phase: The “Quit India” Movement
Due to the failure to democratize India, the Independence Movement had moved
from the demand for self-rule under the Raj in the first phase to independence in the
second, whilst possibly retaining some form of political attachment to Britain, to the
final phase where secession was opted for.410 With the exhaustion of
constitutionalism and after the symbolic “Independence Day” gesture, this time the
Congress turned to unconstitutional means.411 In 1942, the All-India Congress
Committee (“AICC”) passed the “Quit India” resolution, announcing a revolutionary
satyagraha movement against the Raj.412
The A.I.C.C., therefore, repeats with all emphasis the demand for
the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration
of India’s independence, a provisional Government will be formed
and free India will become an ally of the United Nations, sharing
with them in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the
struggle for freedom. The provisional Government can only be
formed by the co-operation of the principal parties and groups in the
country. It will thus be a composite Government, representative of
all important sections of the people of India.413
Gandhi was made the leader.414
“Quit India” took the whole country by storm, only this time the Movement
moved from the denial of the authority relationship between the Indian people and
the Raj to its termination by an active attempt to suspend the juridical order in its
entirety.415 The Congress urged a nation-wide strike to end British rule in two
months.416 However, Gandhi and the major leaders were arrested swiftly following
the commencement of the Movement, which made it highly dependent on popular
participation.417 In fact, Gandhi had foreseen this:
_________________________
408.
Id. at 323.
409.
Id.
410.
Id. at 335.
411.
See id.
412.
Id.
413.
THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 1858 TO 1947 SELECT DOCUMENTS 342 (C. H. Philips et al.
eds., 1962).
414.
Id.
415.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 335.
416.
FRANCIS G. HUTCHINS, INDIA’S REVOLUTION 220 (1973).
417.
Id. at 218.
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A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions
or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress
Committee can function. When this happens, every man and woman
who is participating in this movement must function for himself or
herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued.
Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own
guide.418
In one of its instructions, the AICC issued the following: “Establish a panchayat in
your village. The panchayat will be your Government . . . . Wherever you are wellorganised, take peaceful possession of the Thanas, courts, and other Government
buildings in your area.”419 The Movement was strikingly echoed throughout India
with almost everyone contributing.420 Underground activists included members of
Congress and other political leaders, students and teachers, strikers and unemployed
workers from factories, workers from social welfare institutions, the Sadhus and
Fakirs, etc.421 The Congress’s call for “a gradual escalation through peaceful
picketing to active obstruction of roads and the cutting of telegraph wires” was
followed everywhere.422 Such measures were meant to interrupt and demolish the
British instruments for repression, since most railways, roads, communications, and
government buildings were built only for the British officials and troops and not the
masses.423 Scholars, such as Professor Radhe Shyam Sharma and Dr. Kaushalya
Gairola, revolted on campus, closing the gates and declaring the Benares Hindu
University free Indian soil.424 They further declared the university military training
corps “the army of free India.”425 Francis Hutchins forcefully remarked that “[t]he
implicit purpose of the movement was to destroy the structure of British India.”426
Revolutionary governments were established as an attempt to replace the Raj at
different parts of the country, even though they were “extraordinary arrangements
for extraordinary circumstances.”427 Panchayat Raj (village self-government) was
established in different regions with popular participation in its decision-makings.428
Police stations were taken over and arrangements for tax collection and law courts
were improvised, even though they lasted only for a few weeks.429 In the subsequent
underground phase of the Movement, certain areas were controlled by the Indians
for night governing, which the British were only nominally in charge of during
_________________________
418.
Id. at 219.
419.
Id. at 223.
420.
Id. at 245.
421.
Id.
422.
HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 221.
423.
See British Raj, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/British_Raj
(last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
424.
HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 241.
425.
Id.
426.
Id. at 224.
427.
Id. at 250.
428.
Id.
429.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017

45

Barry Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3

244

Barry Law Review

Vol. 22, No. 2

daytime.430 Even the upper-class approved the Movement, with the Bar attempting
to trick the Chief Justice to close the courts.431 Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar resigned
from the Executive Council of the viceroy and expressed his wish to meet Gandhi;
Indian servants high in government were explicitly and constructively cooperating
with terrorists.432 “Almost everyone contributed”: Villagers refused to send their
grains to the cities and markets for the British; unarmed masses defeated troops and
took control of trains; owners and foremen led strikes, which were joined by
sweepers and apprentices; “[t]ribes took up their bows and arrows” against the
British; and “[c]rowds attacked prisons” whilst “prisoners attacked their guards.”433
The British ran out of sources of information for its police and C.I.D. due to the
Indians’ non-cooperation, and the government felt powerless and could not trust
anyone.434
Despite Gandhi’s preference of nonviolence, the role violence played in the
Movement cannot be ignored. Students and villagers launched organized armed
attacks in different rural areas against the police and district officers on a large
scale.435 Bomb explosions became daily occurrences in regions such as Bombay.436
Activists from the political underground led by Jayaprakash Narayan conducted
guerrilla warfare against the government.437 Therefore, the Movement owes its
success to both Gandhians who insisted on non-violent struggles, which disallows
pre-meditated forms of violence,438 excluding spontaneous violence, such as selfdefense and destruction of property, and the non-Gandhians who employed
organized violence against the British.439 The Movement succeeded in expressing
the will of the Indian people, that they “wanted British rule to end now.”440 “An
acknowledgment that in openly defying the law India’s most important political
organization was supported by general public opinion would be in effect an
acknowledgment that the government could no longer govern.”441 The British
acknowledged this by recognizing that the Movement was of “the people,” which
due to its massive support resulted in the breakdown of the law and order.442 Hutchins
made a remark that “[i]n 1942, British rule was apparently impregnable,” but the
Movement achieved its remarkable feat by “pulling British authority down by a
spontaneous uprising[,] . . . a feat accomplished entirely without the aid of regular
_________________________
430.
HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 250.
431.
Id. at 245.
432.
Id.
433.
Id. at 226.
434.
Id. at 226, 245.
435.
Id. at 229.
436.
HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 230–31 (noting that the number of non-fatal casualties suffered by the
police across different provinces, excluding that of the central government, total 2012 cases whilst fatal cases had
been 63. Non-fatal attacks suffered by other government servants accumulated for 364 cases. Bomb explosions
amounted to 664 cases.).
437.
COPLEY, supra note 376, at 92.
438.
Id.; HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 280. Both Hutchins and Copley contend that Gandhi is only against
premeditated violence but not the employment of violence itself if done spontaneously.
439.
HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 279–80.
440.
Id. at 268.
441.
Id.
442.
See id. at 268–69.
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military forces.”443 The success of the revolutionary Movement lies in its disobedient
character by denying the authority of the British government and overturning the
sovereign-subject relations. “You are our sovereign, our Government, only so long
as we consider ourselves your subjects. When we are not subjects, you are not the
sovereign either.”444 “India declared herself to be already independent, and in India’s
will to act independently the revolution had triumphed.”445 Ultimately, the British
did act on Gandhi’s demand to unilaterally “quit India” in 1947.446
During the Independence Movement, the division between the Hindu and
Muslim people was deepened, which led to their irreconcilable separation.447 The
“Quit India” Movement was participated in by the widespread Hindu population, but
strikingly, the Muslims did not take part in it, even though they did not confront the
Hindus nor assist the British.448 Feelings of unrepresentation by the Congress during
the Movement, reinforced the Muslims’ collective identity as a “we” against the
Hindus as “they.”449 During the first phase of the Movement, the Congress
successfully obtained support from Muslims, until the second phase where the
Hindu-Muslim fracture began to intensify.450 The Congress in the 1938 election still
won a majority nationwide, including a majority for the 482 separate Muslim
seats.451 By contrast, the Muslim League (“League”), which claimed to be the party
that represents the Muslims, by then had only gained 109 seats out of the 482.452 But
under Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s leadership of the League, it started to gain
momentum by criticizing the Congress for being unrepresentative of Muslims.453 By
the time of the 1945 to 1946 election, which was after “Quit India,” the League
captured all thirty seats reserved in the Central Assembly for Muslims as well as won
439 out of 494 Muslim seats in the provincial election.454 This entitled the League to
claim itself speaking for the Muslim-dominated regions and to form its coalition
ministries in Bengal and Sind.455 Consistently demanding a separate sovereign state
for Muslims with the failure of the Congress and the League to reach a consensus,
the League resorted to violence and the “Great Killing” to strive for an independent
state.456 Massive murders were conducted by Muslims towards Hindus, leading to a
situation in which “Muslims predominated, more Hindus were murdered” and vice
versa.457 Jawaharlal Nehru finally made a concession to allow the League to establish
_________________________
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id. at 282.
MAHATMA GANDHI: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS 313 (Judith M. Brown ed., 2008).
HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 283.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 239–40.
See id. at 240.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 323.
Id.
Id. at 325–26.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 344.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 344.
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the Muslims’ own state of Pakistan, and in 1947 upon Britain’s leaving of India,
sovereignty was transferred to two successor regimes, namely India and Pakistan.458
VII. REVOLUTIONARY DISOBEDIENCE: A THEORETICAL DISCOURSE
A. Revolution and Revolutionary Disobedience: A Definition
We must first refresh our memories of Flathman’s theory of authority and the
concept of constituent power discussed in Parts II and III. With those theoretical
conceptions, we can put together a concise definition of revolution: A revolution
occurs in a state of political rupture between the constituent and constituted power,
either where there is a serious dissonance between them over the authority of the
constituted power, over the terms of the constitution, or both.459 Revolution is the
process of change wherein the people assert their popular sovereignty to oust the
office of government (“in authority”) or facilitate the fundamental change of the
constitution (“the authoritative”), whether constitutionally or unconstitutionally.460
The change could be completed through non-violent means, even though violent
means are most commonplace.461 Revolutionary disobedience is a form of political
disobedience that aims to bring about a revolution. It is a revolutionary endeavor not
just to break some unjust laws to appeal to the sense of justice of the majority in the
traditional Rawlsian formula or make a strong political conviction against the
government, but to void the social contract by putting an end to the authority
relationship between the people themselves and the government, and may further
attempt to change the constitution of the state and nullify the constitutional contract.
Revolutionary disobedience signifies an exception to the juridical norm and must
be accomplished via unconstitutionality and extra-legality, which makes its scope
narrower than the concept of revolution. It is also possible that revolutionary
disobedience could be initiated with one “in-authority” in a territory trying to untie
its political and juridical knot with another “in-authority,” which occupies another
area of land; for instance, with the Quebec Government terminating its authority
relationship with the Government of Canada (which has not happened, as of yet).462
After constructing a precise definition of revolutionary disobedience, we can
now proceed to offering a comprehensive discourse of it, including its theoretical as
well as practical implications in the real world context.
B. Revolutionary Disobedience as a “State of Exception”
The implications we can draw from the Indian Independence Movement are
profound as the Indians had denied the authority and legitimacy of the British Raj
_________________________
458.
Id. at 347.
459.
Kalyvas, supra note 159, at 228.
460.
See FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 61, at 117.
461.
See id.
462.
See Michael B. Stein, Separatism in Canada, HISTORICA CANADA
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/separatism/.
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throughout and consistently attempted to suspend the juridical order and put an end
to their authority relationship, which is most obvious during the Quit India
Movement.463 As an act of revolutionary disobedience, it signifies a “state of
exception,” wherein the people decide to deviate from the juridical norms and the
normal situation.464 Under the normal situation, the laws of a legal system are to be
obeyed even if some of them are unjust, and civil disobedience is only activated as
a measure of protest and appeal; but the exception indicates the people’s will to void
the legal order in its entirety, such as the passing of the “Quit India” resolution in
1942.465 “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”466 Such state of exception
clearly signifies that the legal norms fail to bind anymore, a state wherein the extraor anti-juridical actions and occurrences “pass over into law” and “juridical norms
blur with mere fact.”467 Revolutionary disobedience is anti-juridical, as it goes
against the established law and legal order of the state, but it is organized by its own
“law.”468 It resorts to the supra-legal right of the people to abolish the government or
constitution as they constitute the ultimate source of the legal order.
The ultimate ground of the exception here is . . . the principle
according to which “every law is ordained for the common wellbeing of men, and only for this does it have the force and reason of
law [vim et rationem legis]; if it fails in this regard, it has no capacity
to bind [virtutem obligandi non habet].”469
As Schmitt famously puts it, “the legal system itself can anticipate the exception and
can ‘suspend itself.’”470 “The exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state’s
authority. The decision parts here from the legal norm, and (to formulate it
paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on law.”471
The sovereign ruler can directly suspend the juridical order by its power against the
executive, legislature, and judiciary, but the popular sovereign only undertakes to
_________________________
463.
See HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 282.
464.
My argument here, that revolutionary disobedience institutes a state of exception, should be carefully
distinguished from Agamben’s “state of exception” as a paradigm of government, even though they both share
similarities. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., The Univ. of Chi. Press,
2005) (2003). Both of them, for instance, find oneself in an “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the
intersection of the legal and political.” Id. at 1. “The state of exception is not a special kind of law (like the law of
war); rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.” Id.
at 4. For Agamben’s concern, the initiation and normalization of the state of exception opens Pandora’s box as the
government can suspend the legal order and the constitution as it deems fit, or suspend the application of law to
particular subjects such as the Guantanamo Bay detainees, stripping off their entitlements as legal persons. Id. at 3,
5. But the activation of a state of exception by popular sovereignty would not fall into the abyss of absolutism. Id.
at 5. My concern is not a state of exception within the juridical order, but one that is instituted by the people to
suspend the legal order.
465.
See HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 283.
466.
CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5 (George Schwab trans., The Univ. Chi. Press, 2005) (1922).
467.
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 464, at 29.
468.
Romano depicts the paradox of revolution to be this: “[R]evolution is violence, but it is juridically
organized violence.” Id.
469.
Id. at 25.
470.
SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 466, at 14.
471.
Id. at 13.
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suspend the legal order by anti-juridical actions that paralyze it, which leaves its sign
of assertion of popular sovereignty, making the juridical order inoperative so as to
force the “in authority” out of power.472 The suspension of legal order for the popular
sovereign is a protracted process.473
C. The Nature of Revolutionary Disobedience
Here, I will further identify and expand on two essential features of revolutionary
disobedience so that we can have an even more comprehensive and sophisticated
understanding of its nature, as well as to resonate with and support my above
arguments.
1. First Feature: Illegality or Extra-Legality
Revolutionary disobedience creates a constitutional moment by first breaking
into illegality, by means of which it defines the higher law of the land. A
constitutional moment is, by definition, a break in constitutional continuality by
which the constitution or the “higher law” of the land is defined.474 Here, we shall
consider Bruce Ackerman’s theoretical discourse of American history. His
contention is that a key component of the constitutional moment is illegality.475 This
could be seen in the founding of the United States: “[A]s the revolutionary years
moved on, Americans insisted that the People could deliberate on constitutional
matters only in special bodies whose very name –’convention’– denied that legal
forms could ultimately substitute for the engaged participation of citizens.”476 One
of the founding documents of the U.S. Constitution, Federalist No. 40, concedes its
illegality, but argues that by so doing it “was not undermining the Convention’s
authority but, if anything, enhancing it–linking it to the institutional form that
Publius’s contemporaries associated most intimately with We the People.”477
Illegality as a core revolutionary element is also present in the Reconstruction
Moments and arguably in the New Deal and Civil Rights Revolution.478 The
significant function that illegality serves is the provision of “the circumstance for the
emergence of the popular sovereign, precisely because existing legal norms have
receded and opened the door for the people to exercise their constitution-making
power.”479 Under such circumstance, the people can exercise their “sovereign
authority that legitimized . . . those otherwise illegal acts.”480 An act of revolutionary
disobedience must first break into illegality in order to put the legal order into
_________________________
472.
See id. at 12.
473.
See id. (explaining how placing a time limit on measures undertaken for suspension would cause
sovereignty to be less significant, even if not eliminated).
474.
Roman J. Hoyos, Who are “the People?”, 2015-15 SW. L. SCH. 1, 9 (2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2633349.
475.
Id. at 10.
476.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 314, at 175.
477.
Id.
478.
Hoyos, supra note 474, at 10 n.38.
479.
Id. at 11–12.
480.
Id. at 39.
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suspension, bringing about the “super” or “extra-legal” state, as if they are voiding
the constitutional contract.481 The illegal nature of the act twists when the ruler-assovereign loses its authority and the general public regains the authority to decide as
popular sovereign, turning the initial illegality into extra-legality.482 This,
nevertheless, should not be conceived as an easy and oft-occurring task. It is only
possible where an “extraordinary number,” as Ackerman puts it, of fellow citizens
are convinced to engage in such disobedient movement with great seriousness that
they do not accord to normal politics, which entitles it to the label of “higherlawmaking.”483 The majority in the polity must accept the initiative after cautious
deliberation, and the opponents of the proposal must be allowed to strike back with
their ideas.484
2. Second Feature: The People as an Existence Outside and Above the Law
Carl Schmitt’s Three Moments of Democracy could be referenced to clarify the
question of why revolutionary disobedience must constitute a state of exception and
cannot sit within the constitutional order of the state.485 In the first moment, “the
people exist outside and above the law.”486 Such is essentially a founding moment,
“where the people exercise their sovereign authority to create a new constitution.”487
In the second, they exert their power via representation, receding from active
engagement in politics.488 A most commonplace instance of this is election. In the
third, the people exist “next to” the constitutional order, whereby through
acclamatory practice, the people exert their influence to alter legal norms within the
constitutional system.489 The nature of revolutionary disobedience is to challenge the
authority and/or legitimacy of the government and/or that of the state, and therefore
it is impossible for it to be classified as Schmitt’s second moment of democracy,
which is subsumed entirely into the constitutional order.490 But is it possible to exist
alongside with the constitutional order, capable of falling into the “third moment” of
the model? I submit that it is not. Unlike the first moment of democracy, which is
exception, and the second, which is norm, in the third moment “the people exist . . .
both within and outside of the constituted order.”491 The people in such a case can
exert their power to change the norms within the constituted order by “acclamation”
or “public opinion,” where they remain in an unorganized form to voice their will,
exercising their constituent power without contravening the permitted constitutional
_________________________
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.

See id. at 11.
See id.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 314, at 6.
See id.
See Hoyos, supra note 474, at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 24.
See id. at 33.
Hoyos, supra note 474, at 33.
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forms.492 In the second moment, the people are represented, whilst in the third they
are present.493
By acclamation, the people directly announce their presence by acting publicly
and refusing to be dominated by representation,494 which renders their existence
“next to” rather than within the constituted order.495 The greatest problem is that it
lacks in decisive force to effectuate fundamental changes, as the decision to adopt
the new norm must be approved from above by legally-constituted and governing
institutions and procedures, easily resulting in an impasse or simply rejection by the
in-authority.496 In stark contrast, by dint of revolutionary disobedience, the people
directly reject the present “in-authority” so as to destroy it to rebuild a new one,
possibly with a new constitution of the state. It refuses to be bound by the current
constituted order. In other words, the people in such instance exist outside and above
the law. In fact, an act of civil disobedience, such as that led by Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., could be seen as an instance of acclamation. Despite being illegal, its aim
and outcome are to create new norms within the constituted order without breaking
the constitutional continuity of the polity,497 which is apparently different from the
case of revolutionary disobedience.
D. Preconditions of Revolutionary Disobedience
There are certain conditions that must be met before a recourse to revolutionary
disobedience is possible. Previous theoretical studies from Part V inform us of such
necessary conditions. First, it requires territorial concentration of the people. If a
people are not a territorially concentrated group, it would be impossible for them to
be the majority or the substantial bulk of people in the said region, and therefore
impossible for them to disrupt the supremely authoritative institutions therein and to
reconstruct them afterwards. Territorial dispersion effectively prevents revolutionary
disobedience from happening from the start. Second, those authoritative institutions
of the land should have the potential to be self-operative and self-sufficient. If this
_________________________
492.
Id. at 33–34.
493.
See id. at 35–36.
494.
Id. at 35.
495.
Id.
496.
There are other arguments claiming that acclamatory practices easily result in indecision and public
opinion that is misread and misunderstood. Hoyos contends that the problem with it lies in the unlikelihood of the
people to mobilize their sovereign authority but cease at the stage of proclaiming their opinion. See id. at 37. The
manipulation of “public opinion” poses another issue. Hoyos, supra note 474, at 37. Schmitt himself argues that
“[t]he weakness is that the people should decide on the basic questions of their political form and their organization
without themselves being formed or organized. This means that their expression of will are easily mistaken,
misinterpreted, or falsified.” Id. He further stresses that public acclamation is “incomprehensible and resistant to
organization.” Id. at 36.
I respectfully disagree as acclamation does not need to result in these problems. The “genuinely assembled people,”
as opposed to the people institutionalized, can be organized even not institutionalized. They need not be indecisive
and indecipherable in their substance. Civil disobedience and civil resistance do bite, even though not as powerful
as revolutionary disobedience: they are capable in expressing a forceful message, which is easily readable, despite
subject to interpretation. Consider the civil rights movement led by King in the United States that appeals to ending
racial inequality. The true weakness of it, rather than the ones contended above, lies in requiring the “in-authority”
to accept its plea, which can simply refuse it.
497.
See ZINN, supra note 10, at 29.
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condition is granted, the relevant demos can segregate and isolate itself from the
larger unit. For instance, Hong Kong, Catalonia, and Scotland are autonomous units,
which are potentially sovereign and separable from China, Spain, and the United
Kingdom respectively.498 A local government can act in defiance of the central
government, or a sub-state society can act against the state, or a state can act against
the confederation or federal government.499 Potentially any territorially concentrated
demos can become a newly independent people where a substantial amount of them
consider themselves a people, and provided there is the presence of a unique spatiotemporal sphere, with its ability to construct a set of new supremely authoritative
institutions and to destruct or reconstruct the existing set if there is any.500 Espejo’s
theory of people as a process perfectly resonates with my theoretical account that a
people can be ontologically individuated and differentiated given the presence of
three unique conditions, namely: (1) “the time and place in which the process
occurs”; (2) “the character of the practices that constitute, govern, or change a
particular set of supremely authoritative institutions”; and (3) “whether the
individuals who are under the authority of the process’s authoritative institutions
conceive of themselves as part of different peoples.”501
The exercise of revolutionary disobedience, moreover, is inherently democratic.
If Markovits’ model of democratic disobedience is democracy-enhancing, which
seeks to remedy the democratic deficit of a specific law or policy, 502 revolutionary
disobedience is democratic in a more fundamental sense: the assertion of popular
sovereignty. As explicated above, democracy is the collective authorship of the
sovereign will, a process of self-determination wherein individual self-determination
aligns with the collective self-determination through deliberation and contestation.503
By assuming constituent power as its basis, a recourse to revolutionary disobedience
is the exercise of self-determination by ousting the government through mass
mobilization, which is a collective, deliberative action.504 It could be an attempt of
the popular sovereign to consciously form their political will to co-institute its
constitution, which gives the constitution its legitimate normativity as the
fundamental norm of the polity.505 This is a process of fundamental norm and
institutional creation through which the sovereign will is registered as the highest
_________________________
498.
Ho Wai Clarence Leong, Hong Kong, Scotland and Catalonia, a Tale of Three Referenda, COSMOPOLITA
SCOTLAND (Jan. 23, 2015), http://cosmopolitascotland.org/en/hong-kong-scotland-and-catalonia-a-tale-of-threereferenda/.
499.
See, e.g., U.S. HISTORY, The South Secedes, http://www.ushistory.org/us/32e.asp (last visited Mar. 14,
2017).
500.
See ESPEJO, supra note 114, at 163.
501.
Id. at 162.
502.
Markovits, supra note 14, at 1902.
503.
Post, supra note 257, at 27.
504.
An example of this is the Indian Independence Movement narrated above.
505.
An example of this is the American Revolution so far as it is understood as a deliberative body of
representatives trying to decide their own future as a collectivity (the “Americans”), as against being coerced by the
will of others (the British Crown). But under a modern perspective, apparently we could criticize such a deliberate
body to be under-inclusive, and its colonization of America as an infringement of the Native Americans’ right of
self-determination.
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norm of the land, what Ackerman calls the “higher-lawmaking” and “constitutional
moments.”506 We can further look into Ackerman’s theory to elaborate on this point.
One of the most powerful republican theories is Bruce Ackerman’s dualist
conception of democracy.507 In times of normal politics, the general will of the
people may not be recognized correspondingly through constitutional reason (the
established political or legal order).508 For instance, in a representative democracy,
the representatives, such as the senators, are elected by the people and claim that
they are “representing” the people, but there is no guarantee that they act according
to the general will. Because of the concentration of power in any government, despite
democratic, it may still be an elected despotism.509 Ackerman explicates this point
by arguing that “we must systematically reject the idea that when Congress (or the
President or the Court) speaks during periods of normal politics, we can hear the
genuine voice of the American people.”510 Indeed the higher track of politics, the one
that exhibits the real voice of the people, manifests itself only during the rare periods
of constitutional politics when there is a heightened consciousness to define their
collective identity and the fundamental principles that shall govern themselves, to
engage in “higher lawmaking” through deliberation.511 They ask fundamental
questions, such as “who are we,” and “what are the deepest inalienable commitments
that should make up our community?” These are the so-called “constitutional
moments,” where private citizens attempt to hammer out considered judgments on
matters of principle, which are usually reached after years of popular mobilization
and profound debate.512 This makes it different from normal politics, which are not
concerned with constitutional principles but rather “lower lawmaking,” which is
usually more vulnerable to petty self-interest of people and party politics.513
Ackerman’s dualism powerfully explicates why democracy is about the alignment
of the sovereign will and the general will of the people and that it is about the
collective authorship of the sovereign will.514 By destroying the illegitimate state
authority, revolutionary disobedience allows the people to exhibit their general will
by demonstrating that the constituted power (the government) does not genuinely
represent their will. It also enables the mass population to directly engage in
constitutional creation and authorship, to underwrite the fundamental principles of
the community.
_________________________
506.
See Bruce Ackerman, Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L. J. 1013, 1022, 1039
(1984).
507.
It should be noted, nonetheless, that Ackerman’s dualism is employed to analyze how in American
politics a process of higher-lawmaking is achieved as acclamatory practice without surpassing constitutionalism,
wherein the people’s will and call are represented by the government in the process. Id. at 1039. But in contrast,
revolutionary disobedience as a constitution-creation is a process of higher-lawmaking whereby the people exist
above and outside the law.
508.
See id. at 1026.
509.
See id.
510.
Id. at 1027.
511.
See id. at 1039–40.
512.
Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 506, at 1038.
513.
Id. at 1035.
514.
See id. at 1042.
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During these moments of profound rupture, citizens re-claim their
delegated sovereignty through direct popular action. Because the
constitutional provisions do not license these moments of creativity,
the amendment that the constitutional moment carries is not, legally
speaking, democratically licensed. Yet they are democratic in a
more fundamental sense as exercises of political sovereignty.515
E. Conversation or Coercion?
Another intricate question arises. Under a state of profound rupture, does
revolutionary disobedience lead to a dialogue between the constituent power and
constituted power, or is it a mere coercion? I suggest that we can find the answer to
this question by first studying a Gandhian political theory of satyagraha. Theorist
Bhikhu Parekh contends that satyagraha is based on a non-rationalist spirit of
rationality, which is capable of leading to a genuine dialogue.516 Traditional
rationalists consider reason to be essential to rationality, and, when reason as
discussion fails, all that is left is violence.517 Parekh accuses this as a false dichotomy
of rationality and morality, and satyagraha reconceptualizes the locus of rationality:
Discussion is not always rational, and rational dialogue implies that the relevant
parties are prepared to propose and be influenced by argument.518 The end of
satyagraha is to facilitate a dialogue, by insisting on certain commitments in a
truthful and sincere manner, to attempt to move and persuade the other party to
reconsider its convictions with sympathy and wholeheartedness and not selfish
interest.519 Parekh argues that almost every satyagraha that Gandhi launched passed
through three stages: “[A] clear and reasoned defence of its objectives, a popular
agitation to convince the government of the intensity of popular feeling, and an
ultimatum to give it the last chance for negotiation.”520 As analyzed above, the
disobedient movements always led the British to reconsider their submissions and
led to a dialogue and a renewal of dialogue.521 But still, satyagraha is a form of
coercion, even though it may not coerce its subject to make specific concessions but
to reconsider its stance on the one hand, and the satyagrahis’ proposals on the other,
as well as engages in a reflective discussion.522
Likewise, the employment of revolutionary disobedience turns the state into an
exception, which paralyzes the legal order, forcing the sovereign-as-ruler to
reconsider its convictions. The first two phases of the Indian National Movement can
be seen as such. The popular mobilization exhibits a rupture, but it could be discerned
as a form of “action dialogue”—a constitutional conversation between the sovereign
_________________________
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.

SCOTT VEITCH ET AL., JURISPRUDENCE: THEMES AND CONCEPTS 69 (2d ed. 2012).
See BHIKHU PAREKH, GANDHI’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 164 (1991).
Id. at 164–65.
See id. at 165.
Id. at 143–44.
Id. at 150.
See, e.g., HUTCHINS, supra note 416, at 282–83.
See PAREKH, supra note 516, at 143–44.
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and the people.523 Ackerman illustrates this point in a fascinating manner. He argues
that the people interact with the government in an intricate way.524 For instance,
during the Civil Rights Movement led by Dr. King, the people engaged in mass
mobilization, such as civil disobedience in demonstration of their will.525 Whilst the
larger population may not have engaged in civil disobedience or campaign, they
made a decision to choose President Johnson over Goldwater.526 Meanwhile, the
former endorsed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 while the latter condemned it, giving
the voters a choice to define their constitutional identity.527 Ackerman argues that the
ordinary Americans, by choosing Johnson, amended the written constitution.528
Besides, the Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court responded to the
Movement in multiple ways, the most prominent of which is the decision of
Brown.529 Despite the political rupture, a dialogue is still possible between the
constituted and constituent power through action and reaction.
However, we must not romanticize the extent to which a dialogue is possible to
achieve. Non-violent, dialogue-generating political disobedience can only go so far
to subject its target into reflection and could only succeed if it sincerely does so. It
all hinges upon the other party’s response-ability: it would not yield to any results if
the re-contemplation is superficial or the division in opinion between the parties is
too deep-seated. This marks the limits of non-violent political disobedience, both
civil and revolutionary, even though revolutionary disobedience is more forceful
given its intensity and damage, albeit non-violent. In fact, the first two phases of the
Indian Independence Movement’s failure to secure the desired outcome were partly
attributable to Gandhi’s insistence on non-violence.530 Non-violent political
disobedience easily results in an impasse where the contenders both hold fast to their
own convictions, or where concessions are made, the compromise reached is only
another evil.531 This ultimately leads to the role of violence,532 which might be
necessary or even morally obligatory to trump injustice.533 The “Quit India”
_________________________
523.
See VEITCH ET AL., supra note 515, at 69.
524.
See Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, supra note 41, at 3116.
525.
See id.
526.
Id. at 3117, 3118.
527.
Id. at 3118.
528.
See id.
529.
See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (ruling that the doctrine of separate but
equal had no place in education).
530.
WOLPERT, supra note 380, at 335.
531.
See id.
532.
In the modern era we start to abhor the idea of violence and its application of politics, but let us not forget
that it may be necessary as the ultimate means to vanquish the greater evil. Craig Rosebraugh contends that the
American Revolution is an armed struggle, Nelson Mandela had resorted to violence in the South African freedom
struggle after exhausting peaceful means, and King’s Civil Rights Movement owed its success partly to the Black
Panther group’s armed struggle. Given the sound reasoning and history of political violence, Rosebraugh argues that
it enjoys legitimacy. See CRAIG ROSEBRAUGH, THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 247–61 (2004).
533.
I do not wish to twist the meaning of “violence” to encompass concepts such as injustice, which is very
often done by theorists that take its definition beyond recognition. Bufacchi offers a succinct definition of violence:
it is a violation of the integrity (understood as wholeness) of a being, whether human or object, caused by an action
or omission. Admittedly, violence is an evil because it is undesirable, but it may be justified for the sake of justice.
Bufacchi proposes five principles that could justify violence: (1) the principle of self-defence; (2) the principle of
reasonable success (“a reasonable probability of success”); (3) the principle of proportionality (“the use of violence
must be proportional to the violence it encounters”); (4) the principle of last resort (violence is justified “only if all
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Movement attained its triumph with both violent and non-violent tactics, and without
violence it could not have caused as much destruction to incapacitate the British
ruling.534
F. The Umbrella Movement: When Civil Disobedience and Dialogue Fail
Civil disobedience traditionally seeks to break the law in accordance with certain
political principles to appeal to the majority and coerce its subject, whether the
people or government, into reconsidering its convictions and beliefs.535 But what if
civil disobedience fails to achieve its desired aims? Would that lead to simply more
acts of civil disobedience and civil resistance? And what if they fail too and the
government is completely irresponsive? If we are to take direct actions, do we resort
to violent actions in compliance with the principle of last resort and gradual
progression tout court? In this section, I will set out such an example, namely the
Umbrella Movement, which in stark contrast to the American Civil Rights
Movement, did not obtain any genuine response from the government. I will argue
that the dichotomy between non-violent civil disobedience and violent revolutionary
attempt is a false one, and non-violent revolutionary disobedience can offer a third
way out as a direct course of political action.
In January 2013, Mr. Benny Tai first proposed the idea of employing civil
disobedience to strive for democracy in Hong Kong.536 His idea was, as a last resort
where other legal attempts failed, a civil disobedience movement, which can be
initiated with at least 10,000 people blocking the main blocks and roads in Central,
Hong Kong to “paraly[z]e” Hong Kong’s political and economic capital, hence the
name “Occupy Central.”537 Such action was carried out with an aim to force the
Beijing government to change its stance and grant Hong Kong people “genuine
election” over the chief executive and all members of H.K.’s Legislative Council.538
Mr. Tai explicitly set out the reason behind the recourse to civil disobedience:
Hongkongers have been fighting for democracy for over thirty years, but the H.K.
election system is still immensely undemocratic.539 More recently, Hongkongers are
_________________________
peaceful alternatives have been exhausted”); and (5) the principle of gradual progression (“one has a duty to always
start with the minimum amount of violence” and escalate gradually). VITTORIO BUFACCHI, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE 90–91, 166–67, 178–85 (2007).
534.
Despite having employed violent measures, it must be recognized that violence is not the only factor that
led to the triumph of the Movement, but one of the contributing causes. The previous Indian revolt against the British
in 1857, for instance, despite its recourse to violence to overthrow the British Raj, failed. See HUTCHINS, supra note
416, at 282–83.
535.
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 122 (Hugo A. Bedau, 1973).
536.
Benny Tai (戴耀廷), Gongmin Kangming de Zuida Shashangli Wuqi (公民抗命的最大殺傷力武器)
[Civil Disobedience as the Most “Destructive” Weapon], H.K. ECON. J., (Jan. 16, 2013); Grace Tsoi & Bethany
Allen-Ebrahimian, Hong Kong Protest Leaders: Who are the People Behind the Movement?, STAR (Oct. 2, 2014),
https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/10/02/hong_kong_protest_leaders_who_are_the_people_behind_the_m
ovement.html.
537.
BENNY TAI, ZHANGLING ZHONGHUAN, (佔領中環) [OCCUPY CENTRAL] 32–34 (3d ed., 2013).
538.
Id. at 47. This, indeed, falls into the classic paradigm of liberal disobedience under Markovits’s
classification.
539.
At present, only half of the members of the Legco are directly elected by the Hong Kong citizens, whilst
the other half are elected only by eligible voters under the functional constituencies, which have fewer than 10,000
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guaranteed the constitutional right under the Hong Kong Basic Law to elect the chief
executives and the whole body of the legislature, but since 2003, all meaningful
democratic reforms have been jettisoned by the H.K. government.540 Legal attempts
to facilitate discussion over democratic reform had been made in numerous manners
but failed.541 Tai’s “Occupy Central” fit perfectly into the Rawlsian conception of
civil disobedience, which stresses the non-violent, public, and political nature of the
act.542 Tai also lays emphasis on generating deliberation, having made three
“deliberation days” for any people interested in participating for the sake of
negotiating and discussing issues concerning H.K.’s democracy realization and the
details and principles of an aspired election system.543 Only after such extensive
discussion would possible options be put forward by a professional committee of
constitutional and political experts, which also need to receive “democratic
authorization” of the H.K. people.544 These proposals would then be submitted to the
H.K. government and the Beijing government for their consideration.545 If and only
if the governments reject both the proposals and fail to bring out other acceptable
options would “Occupy Central” be initiated.546 Tai stresses time and again that those
democratic reform proposals must conform to international standards547 and not be
fettered with “Chinese characteristics.”548
_________________________
registered voters since 2012. See GITTINGS, supra note 366, at 135. So far as the chief executive is concerned, its
candidates are elected by the Election Committee composed of only 1,200 people from different sectors such as the
financial industry. The members of the Committee are not elected nor authorized by the H.K. people. Id. at 95–99.
540.
The H.K. government did propose undemocratic electoral system reform, however. In June 2014, the
H.K. government began a public consultation on reform for the 2017 chief executive election mechanism. However,
on August 31, the NPCSC announced to retain the past method of formation of the Election Committee but
candidates would need above fifty percent of its members’ endorsement for the candidacy. Only after such prescreening could H.K. citizens vote for the candidates to be the chief executive. It is a blatantly undemocratic
arrangement. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, THE SIX-MONTHLY REPORT
ON HONG KONG 1 JULY TO 31 DECEMBER 2014, 2015, at 2–3 (UK).
541.
Legal attempts had been made in numerous ways: Protests including the traditional July 1 march that has
been held every year since 2003, Legco members from the Pan-democracy camp consistently demanding for
democratic reforms and for that reason, even resigning from Legco to stage a mini-referendum which earns its name
the “Five Constituencies Referendum.” See Stephan Ortmann, The Umbrella Movement and Hong Kong’s
Protracted Democratiszation Process, 46(1) ASIAN AFF. 32, 39–48.
542.
Tania Branigan, Occupy Central Gives Downtown Hong Kong a Taste of Disobedience (Mar. 6, 2014
1:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/06/occupy-central-hong-kong-democracy-campaign.
543.
TAI, OCCUPY CENTRAL, supra note 537, at 44–46; see also Kin-man Chan, Occupying Hong Kong, 12
SUR J. 1, 2 (2015).
544.
Kin-man Chan, supra note 543.
545.
See id. at 4.
546.
See id.
547.
TAI, OCCUPY CENTRAL, supra note 537, at 54, 56–57; see Luke Cooper, Interview: Occupy Central
Founder Benny Tai Yiu-Ting, RED PEPPER (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.redpepper.org.uk/the-spirit-of-civildisobedience/; see HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF
HONG KONG, CHINA, ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS 107TH SESSION (11-28 MARCH 2013), ¶ 6, U.N. DOC.
CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3 (Apr. 29 2013) [hereinafter Concluding Observations]. Conformity to international
standards of democracy could be read against and guided by legal instruments such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. In fact, even the Human Rights Committee criticized the H.K. government for its lack
of clear planning for promoting the people’s right to universal suffrage and urged the government to “implement
universal and equal suffrage in conformity with the Covenant as a matter of priority for all future elections.”
Concluding Observations, ¶ 6 U.N. Doc.
548.
Cooper, supra note 547.
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Tai’s plans had been carried out, at large, accordingly.549 The three Deliberation
Days were carried through, and the leaders of the movement put in place a “civil
referendum” from June 20-22, 2014, which allowed all H.K. citizens older than
eighteen to vote in polling stations or on an online system over their preferred
election mechanism for H.K.’s chief executive.550 They were given three options:
public nomination, a broadly representative nominating committee, and a mixed
nominating system, which allows “nomination from the public, political parties, and
the nominating committee.”551 Around 800,000 of H.K.’s seven million population
had voted in the referendum, and the majority favored the mixed system.552 Given
2014 was the year of consultation for the 2017 chief executive election reform, the
referendum did not include voting for the election method for the LegCo members.553
But soon after the referendum, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress made the decision that the composition, arrangements, and number of
members of the nomination committee for 2017 would remain identical as before:
the same unrepresentative nomination committee composed of 1,200 members.554
However this time, each candidate would need to be endorsed by 50% of its members
instead of the 12% threshold for the previous election committee.555 But this
remained a proposal by the Standing Committee, which would need to be passed by
the LegCo.556
This eventually led to the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement.557 Following the
NPCSC decision, around 13,000 university students participated in a boycott on
September 22, and leaders of Scholarism and the Federation of Students jumped into
the fenced Civic Square, which is attached to the H.K. government headquarters, as
a sign of protest.558 Due to the heavy police force employed, Tai and other Occupy
leaders joined the protest and proclaimed the start of Occupy Central.559 But as
student leaders took the lead over the Movement, it did not go exactly the way as Tai
planned.560 Occupation took place across main roads in Admiralty instead of Central,
and it spread to Causeway Bay, Mong Kok, and Tsim Sha Tsui.561 As the police
started to use pepper spray and tear gas against the protesters in Admiralty on
September 27, more people joined the Movement.562 The messages of the Movement
were loud and sound: “‘[W]e want genuine universal suffrage . . .’ and ‘self_________________________
549.
See Kin-man Chan, supra note 543, at 5.
550.
Id. at 3.
551.
Id. at 4.
552.
Hong Kong Democracy “Referendum” Draws Nearly 800,000, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28076566.
553.
See Kin-man Chan, supra note 543, at 1.
554.
Id. at 4.
555.
Johannes Chan, Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, 103(6) ROUND TABLE 571, 576 (2014).
556.
Id.
557.
Id.
558.
School Students Join Week-Long HK Democracy Protests, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29373615.
559.
Kin-man Chan, supra note 543, at 5.
560.
See id.
561.
Id.
562.
Johannes Chan, supra note 555.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017

59

Barry Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3

258

Barry Law Review

Vol. 22, No. 2

determined destiny.’”563 Despite its clear messages, neither the H.K. government nor
the Beijing authority made any meaningful response.564 The Movement did
encourage the government to meet the students, where the student leaders of the
Movement made clear to the government that they demanded the withdrawal of the
NPCSC decision, the endorsement of public nomination for the chief executive
election, the abolition of functional constituencies operating the LegCo election
mechanism, and a clear timetable to reach these objectives.565 That said, the H.K.
government offered no real alternative reform options but only proposed to submit a
report to the Beijing authority and undertake to enlarge the scope of representation
of the nomination committee in the next round of consultation.566 The student leaders
accused such “offers” as too ambivalent and refused to accept them, hence returning
to the occupied areas.567 Throughout the Movement, police brutality was
pervasive.568 Police constables were video-recorded kicking and beating protesters,
as well as deliberately permitting gangsters to batter and assault protesters.569 After
the injunctions were issued by the courts to disallow protesters to occupy the districts
and the masses were dispersed by the police, the H.K. government refused to discuss
any further the 2017 chief executive election reform.570
The Umbrella Movement failed to secure any outcome.571 In this sense, even the
first two phases of the Indian National Movement are comparatively more successful
in securing democratic reforms fed by the British Raj in a piecemeal fashion. Given
the irresponsive and insincere attitude of the H.K. government, there has not been
any genuine dialogue, nor is there likely to be any.572 The American Civil Rights
Movement, analyzed above, which took place in a state where a democratic system
is largely present and its practice secure, inherited what Ackerman called a dualist
constitutional system, which is responsive and reflective, under which the
constitution could change by the people’s initiation with their proposal.573 The
essence of a democratic system is to enable a revolution to be brought about within
the system without demolishing it574 and the destructive consequences that usually
accompany a revolutionary act. Nonetheless, it is highly improbable, if not
_________________________
563.
See Adrian P. Y. Chow, The Umbrella Movement: The Bigger Picture Behind and Its Broader
Imaginations, 47 CULTURAL STUD. LINGNAN 1, 4. The overrunning theme and demand of the Movement is
democracy and self-determination because it is a reaction against and opposition to the NPCSC’s decision to forbid
democratic reforms of the election system. Other messages that appeared in the Movement, such as the alleviation
of economic inequality, are merely ancillary.
564.
See Johannes Chan, supra note 555, at 577 (“The government at first agreed to hold talks with the
students on 13 October 2014, but it unilaterally cancelled the talks at the last minute.”).
565.
Id.
566.
Id.
567.
Id.
568.
See, e.g., Hong Kong Police Charged Over Protester Beating, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34536710.
569.
Id.
570.
See, e.g., Chris Buckley, Three Months of Protests End Quietly in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2014, at A6.
571.
See id.
572.
See Kin-man Chan, supra note 543, at 6.
573.
See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 314, at 6.
574.
See Jean Hampton, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 13, 32–34 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
1995).
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impossible, to reconstruct the constitutional arrangements or to change the political
system as the people wish where the constituted power is unresponsive and
illegitimate.575
This is the deadlock in which H.K. finds itself. It is hardly possible for the H.K.
people to secure fundamental political changes (as the Americans did) under a
largely undemocratic system, where the chief executive and other executive
members are unaccountable to the public. Moreover, the U.S. government can
reasonably be called to possess legitimacy over its people, but, in contrast, the H.K.
government is seriously deficient in legitimacy, if there is any.576 Most markedly, it
lacks in democratic legitimacy and the Razian sense of legitimacy: It is neither
democratically authorized nor capable of performing its tasks under the service
conception of authority. It has failed continuously even to grant Hongkongers their
constitutional right to elect their chief executive and the LegCo members.577 This
could justify the Hongkongers to deny the legitimacy of their government and put an
end to their authority relationship if they so choose.
Having analyzed in Part V that Hongkongers are themselves a people, they have
the right and power as a single unit to exercise popular sovereignty to overthrow the
government and rewrite the constitution. The Hongkongers as a demos satisfies the
two essential conditions for revolutionary disobedience: (1) It is a territorially
concentrated people spreading across the Hong Kong territory, which marks its land
border at the north of the New Territories (H.K.) with Shenzhen, China; and (2) it
has a potential for complete self-governance as it already has a local government
with the executive, legislature, and judiciary in place, which wields the highest
power in the respective domains, despite subject to the authority of the PRC over a
limited range of issues.578 Under this setting, the Hongkongers can cease the
authority relationship between themselves and the Chinese government and attempt
to forfeit the Hong Kong government’s authority over themselves, authorizing a new
government in the territory as well as engaging themselves in their higher lawmaking to define the constitution. This does not mean that they have to resort to
violence immediately after civil disobedience has failed and if it continues to fail,
but they could resort to non-violent revolutionary disobedience as another starting
point, which is even more forceful, coercive, and pervasive. A reference point is the
first two stages of the Indian Independence Movement delineated above, which are
non-violent at large.579
_________________________
575.
See id. at 34.
576.
See discussion supra Section VII.D. As a side note, on the practical dimension, denying the legitimacy
of the U.S. government and aiming to demolish its authority over African Americans may be counterproductive. As
mentioned, the recourse to revolutionary disobedience requires a regionally-concentrated people, whereas African
Americans are dispersed across the U.S. and therefore cannot make use of the revolutionary disobedience model
formulated in this Article. See id. On the contrary, the Hong Kong people can resort to revolutionary disobedience,
given the concentration of its population and clearly defined territory, which separates itself from China. Id
577.
Kin-man Chan, supra note 543, at 4.
578.
See China’s Special Administrative Regions (SAR), UNDERSTANDING CHINA, http://understandchina.com/special-administrative-region-sar/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2017); see Part V. D for further explication on
the subject.
579.
In these pages, I do not attempt to recommend the concrete specific methods and mechanisms by which
Hongkongers can apply for a revolutionary disobedience movement, as this Article focuses on offering theoretical

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017

61

Barry Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3

260

Barry Law Review

Vol. 22, No. 2

VIII. POLITICAL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW DEMYSTIFIED: A
REPLY TO THE HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION
In this Article, I have expounded a theory of revolutionary disobedience and the
difference between it and civil disobedience. Some may be tempted, despite its
empirical and theoretical tenability, to question its morality and justifiability. One of
such questions may be: Is revolutionary disobedience compatible with the rule of
law? Due to its jurisprudential significance, I devote a section to explicate the
compatibility of revolutionary disobedience with the rule of law and answer the
question of how the rule of law informs us differently on civil disobedience and
revolutionary disobedience. Also, given the interesting arguments that the Hong
Kong Bar Association (“HKBA”) had advanced on the subject of the rule of law and
civil disobedience, I attempt to offer a reply to them as well as an analysis on the
subject in order to dispel the theoretical perplexities.
A. Objections from the Hong Kong Bar Association
In 2004, amidst the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement, court injunctions were
granted on three occasions to clear the protest sites in Mong Kok, Admiralty, and
Causeway Bay respectively.580 The HKBA urged the protestors to comply with the
injunctions and leave the sites, arguing that insubordination to the court rulings
would be “a direct affront to the Rule of Law”581 despite the admission that the
protest itself can be justified as a case of civil disobedience.582 However, the HKBA’s
statements are ambivalent, to say the least, on how the defiance of court injunctions
is inimical to the rule of law but only ceaselessly repeat their objection to such course
of action as well as resort to citations here and there.583 The HKBA further alleges
_________________________
assessments and discourse on it. See generally GENE SHARP, FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 79 (Albert
Einstein Inst., 2010), for a practical application of non-violent political struggle. Appendix One of the book provides
198 exemplary methods of non-violent actions. See id. at 79–86. Most of its suggested methods of political
intervention are seen in the Indian Independence Movement, such as “overloading of administrative systems,”
“seeking imprisonment,” “civil disobedience of ‘neutral’ laws,” building “dual sovereignty and parallel
government,” etc. Id. at 86.
580.
Chris Buckley & Alan Wong, Hong Kong Clears an Area of Pro-Democracy Protesters, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2014, at A8.
581.
H.K. B. ASS’N, STATEMENT OF HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION IN RESPECT OF MASS DEFIANCE OF
COURT ORDERS [hereinafter MASS DEFIANCE OF COURT ORDERS], ¶ 2 (2014).
582.
H.K. B. ASS’N, STATEMENT OF THE HONG KONG BAR ASSOCIATION ON THE RULE OF LAW AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE [hereinafter THE RULE OF LAW AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE], ¶ 2 (2014).
583.
The H.K. Bar Association made clear that the deliberate breach of court injunctions makes one legally
liable to the criminal charge of contempt of court, but its contentions lack in solid theoretical grounding as to how
is such defiance “unquestionably” erosive to the rule of law. See id. For instance, it cited a precedent of the H.K.
High Court’s ruling on civil disobedience wherein the defendant defied the court injunction:
If it is shown that any of the defendants have acted in contempt of that injunction they will be
held accountable. I say that because, unless the integrity of our judicial system is honoured,
this court will be unable to afford the very protection that the defendants themselves have
sought from it.
Sec’y for Justice v. Ocean Tech. Ltd. (t/a Citizens’ Radio),
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that “the inescapable fact is that any discussion of electoral progress must be
conducted within the framework of what is constitutionally permitted.”584 It cites the
Honourable Mr. Justice Kemal Bokhary’s view that “any proposal of universal
suffrage in Hong Kong must be pursued within the framework of the Basic Law,”
warning that “the HKBA views with considerable alarm the suggestion from some
quarters, in the course of the continued political discourse, that any discussion of
constitutional or legal principles is a form of ‘trickery’ or insistence on ‘trivial
technicalities.’”585 We cannot help but ask: Is the Bar Association right in this
instance on the rule of law and constitutionality? For political disobedience, does it
come into irreconcilable conflict with the ideal of the rule of law, and if so, which
should prevail? If we are reminded of Raz, the bewilderment only deepens.586 Before
arguing on those issues, we must come clean about what the rule of law is and how
the HKBA comes to its conclusion.
B. The Rule of Law Demystified
The concept of “the rule of law” is a much contested subject, with different
understandings of its constituent elements by different theorists. Scholars notice the
ambivalence of the idea of the rule of law, which increasingly becomes a moral highground lacking in substance.587 But generally the concept can be classified into a
number of different accounts. Theories of the rule of law can first be divided into
formal versions and substantive versions, with the former stressing its formal and
procedural character and the latter adding into formality with other content
specifications such as individual rights.588 For both versions, theories could generally
be distinguished with their degree of requirements in the concept of “the rule of law,”
running from “thinner” to “thicker” accounts.589 We should start off with the formal
theories.
_________________________
HKCU 1915 [10], Nov. 24, 2009, http://law.lexisnexis.com/webcenters/hk/Daily-Cases/Secretary-for-Justice-vOcean-Technology-Limited-trading-as-Citizens-Radio--Ors. But this, the entitlement or onus of the court to convict
the lawbreaker, does not explicate how breaching a court injunction is compromising the rule of law.
584.
H.K. B. ASS’N, THE RULE OF LAW AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 582, at ¶ 8.
585.
Id.
586.
If we recall the discussion of Raz’s theses in Part II A, seemingly the disobedient are obliged to abide by
the injunction. The Movement therefore would come to an end. Under Raz’s pre-emptive thesis, the court’s order
would be an exclusionary reason of action for the protesters, which serves to replace the original political reasons
that motivated them to demonstrate. The H.K. court is the authority of the H.K. law and legal system, which has far
better knowledge of the law therein than the ordinary citizens, thus satisfying Raz’s ‘dependence thesis’ or ‘service
conception of authority.’ But as argued in Part II, there is no reason why an authority’s directive must be an
exclusionary reason for action. See ARENDT, supra note 59. Moreover, even if it constitutes a non-compliance of
the court’s “protected reason” issued for its action, and thus breaching Raz’s pre-emptive thesis, it does not warrant
us to conclude that such insubordination violates the rule of law. The rule of law shall be the centre of discussion of
this Section.
587.
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 2–4 (2009).
588.
Id. at 91–113. Substantive theories of the rule of law do not concern us in this Article, but they append
other qualities to the concept besides conceding the rule of law as formal justice. Ronald Dworkin entangles the rule
of law to substantive justice whereas T.S. Allan is concerned with how “the rule of law” should be applied to judges
in decision-making, attaching other attributes to the concept of “rule of law” such as equity and rationality. See
T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 28–33
(1995).
589.
TAMANAHA, supra note 587, at 91.
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The thinnest formal account of the rule of law implies “that whatever a
government does, it should do through laws.”590 This degrades the rule of law to
“rule by law,” stripping the idea of any concrete meaning as the law merely becomes
an instrumentality of the government and not a limitation on it, which is sine qua non
of the rule of law tradition.591 Such narrative is also a misconception as it goes against
the classical origins of the rule of law.592 In ancient Greece, the law is literally the
outcome of activities of the citizens.593 Equality before the law is essential.594 The
courts and assemblies are given a separate status to protect the people against a
populist tyranny, with the role of respecting the law and acting as guardians of the
law and “not to declare the law as they pleased.”595 Due to the fact that a populist
democracy and the rule of law would come into conflict, Plato reasoned that the
government needs to be bound by the law.596
Where the law is subject to some other authority and has none of its
own, the collapse of the state, in my view, is not far off; but if law
is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then
the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that
the gods shower on a state.597
Aristotle echoes in his discourse: “That is why it is thought to be just that among
equals everyone be ruled as well as rule, and therefore that all should have their
turn. . . . And the rule of the law, it is argued, is preferable to that of any
individual.”598 Brian Tamanaha summarizes several central themes of the
Aristotelian idea of the rule of law: self-rule in the polis with political equality
upheld; government officials subject to the law; and “the identification of law with
reason” under which judges need to reason syllogistically and silence their own
passions, serving to diminish the possibility of their abuse of power.599
Modern theories of the rule of law have inherited from the classics and have
made developments and breakthroughs.600 Another thin paradigmatic formal theory
of rule of law is introduced here, which is the common denominator of almost all
formal and substantive theories. To Raz, “the rule of law” in its broadest sense means
that people should abide by the law and be ruled by it.601 But in its narrower sense in
political philosophy and jurisprudence, it entails that the government should be ruled
_________________________
590.
Noel B. Reynolds, Grounding the Rule of Law, 2 RATIO JURIS 1, 5 (1989).
591.
TAMANAHA, supra note 587, at 92.
592.
Id.
593.
Id. at 7.
594.
Id.
595.
Id. at 8.
596.
See PLATO: THE LAWS 174 (Penguin Books ed., Trevor Saunders trans., 1970).
597.
Id.
598.
ARISTOTLE: THE POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 88 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2004).
599.
TAMANAHA, supra note 587, at 9.
600.
See id. at 91.
601.
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 212.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol22/iss2/3

64

: Revolutionary Disobedience

Spring 2017

Revolutionary Disobedience

263

by the law and subject to it.602 The value of the rule of law lies in its function to
protect people’s political freedom and dignity to a certain extent.603 Under the rule
of law, people know what to expect and can plan their lives accordingly.604 The
government’s power is restricted and arbitrary power is eliminated, and the
government is forbidden from changing the law retrospectively, or abruptly, or
secretly for its own purposes.605 People are able to choose lifestyles and pursuits, to
fix long-term goals, and direct their lives towards them under a stable and secure
legal framework.606 The rule of law implies the self-restraint of the law, which makes
it a stable and safe basis for individual planning.607 Political freedom consists of the
meaning that limits be “imposed on the powers of public authorities to minimize
interference with personal freedom,” and constitutional rights are protected under
the rule of law.608 Also, intrinsic in the idea of human dignity is the respect for
personal autonomy and people’s right to plot their future.609 Even though the
honoring of the rule of law does not guarantee respect for human dignity, given that
the law may institute slavery without infringing the rule of law, the deliberate
disregard of it certainly violates human dignity.610 This is done by frustrating
people’s expectations and reliance on the seemingly stable legal system, depriving
them of their capacity to plan for their future.611 Raz rightly stresses that the rule of
law is essentially a negative value by its formal character: “[C]onformity to it does
not cause good except through avoiding evil and the evil which is avoided is evil
which could only have been caused by the law itself.”612 True, the law unavoidably
creates the great danger of arbitrary power and the rule of law seeks to minimize that
danger.613 But given its character, it is compatible with gross human rights violations
as it says nothing pertaining to the mechanism or system that produces the law,
whether a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, or monocracy.614
Most theorists could agree to the formal features of “the rule of law” that Raz
delineates, even though some of them insist that there are more traits to the idea.615
The rule of law as a political ideal requires due process and procedural justice, that
the law be general by taking the form of rules, that the law be certain by being clearly
expressed and adequately publicized, that the law be prospective and not
retrospective, that the legal system be internally consistent, and that the discretion of
government be limited.616 Jurists agree that the virtues of the rule of law secure
_________________________
602.
Id.
603.
Id. at 220–21.
604.
Id. at 222.
605.
Id. at 219.
606.
Id. at 220.
607.
See RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW supra note 4, at 220.
608.
Id.
609.
Id. at 221.
610.
Id. at 221–22.
611.
See id. at 222.
612.
Id. at 224.
613.
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 219–23.
614.
Id. at 220–21.
615.
See id. at 214. Albeit inexhaustible, Raz generalizes the ideal of the rule of law into eight principles. Id.
616.
Christine Sypnowich, Utopia and the Rule of Law, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW 179 (David
Dyzenhaus ed., 1999). As Raz rightly puts it, the rule of law exists as a matter of degree, as some laws can be
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people’s liberty, individuality, autonomy, and equality before the law.617 Having
analyzed the rule of law by its historical layers, political role, and its theoretical
variations, Tamanaha boils the concept down to three overrunning themes.618 The
first theme is “government limited by law.”619 This thread runs from the classical
notion of restraint on the tyranny of government to the modern version of individual
liberty under the law.620 There are two senses to this ideal. In the first sense, the
government must abide by the currently valid law.621 The law could be changed with
the existing mechanism, but until then the government officials are bound by it.622 In
the second sense, the government is not to change the law as it wishes, but only with
its permitted law-making power.623 In the Middle Ages, the restraint was divine law,
and in modern times, it is values such as human rights or the constitution.624 The
second theme is formal legality.625 The rule of law from this perspective requires
public, perspective laws with the qualities of generality, certainty, and equality of
application.626 The fullest procedural meaning of formal legality also entails the
availability of a fair hearing in the judicial process.627 The third theme of the meaning
of the rule of law is contrasted with the rule of men.628 The rule of law in this third
sense applies constraints to all officials in their governmental capacity and
necessitates the judiciary to ensure that all other government officials are held
accountable to the law.629 This could only be made possible with the separation of
powers and the independence of the judiciary, as well as the legal profession
maintaining its legal services.630
C. Misconceiving the Rule of Law
A question certainly arises. How do political acts such as civil disobedience or
revolutionary disobedience transgress or “unquestionably erode” the rule of law, as
the HKBA puts it?631 I suggest that we can find an answer by tracking down to John
Rawls. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls devoted a section to analyze how the rule of
_________________________
retrospective even though they cannot be pervasive for the rule of law to be respected, and laws should typically be
general but government departments do have legal discretion and courts do make specific laws such as punishments.
617.
See ALLAN, supra note 588, at 28. Despite Allan’s criticism of Raz downplaying the rule of law as he
overlooked “the fundamental role of law as constituting a stable framework of rules, which enable[s] everyone to
pursue his own aims in a reasonable confidence about the likely conduct of others,” Raz explicitly recognized such
political freedom allowed by the rule of law. See RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 224, 228–29.
618.
TAMANAHA, supra note 587, at 114–19.
619.
Id.
620.
See id. at 115.
621.
Id.
622.
See id.
623.
Id.
624.
TAMANAHA, supra note 587, at 115.
625.
Id. at 119.
626.
Id.
627.
Id.
628.
Id. at 122.
629.
Id. at 122.
630.
See TAMANAHA, supra note 587, at 123.
631.
H.K. B. ASS’N, MASS DEFIANCE OF COURT ORDERS, supra note 581, at 2.
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law contributes to furthering justice and liberty.632 He argues that “the conception of
formal justice, the regular and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the
rule of law when applied to the legal system.”633 To Rawls, the rule of law is vital,
albeit not all-inclusive, in protecting people’s liberty by establishing a basis for
legitimate expectations.634 Given the comprehensive scope and regulative powers of
a legal system, restraints must be placed upon such embracive power, and the rule of
law provides “a more secure basis for liberty and a more effective means for
organizing cooperative schemes.”635 It ensures people’s legal liberty.636 But Rawls
certainly notes that the rule of law is compatible with injustice and only imposes
“rather weak constraints on the basic structure.”637 In a later chapter, he explicates
the role of civil disobedience in his liberal theory of justice.638 An act of civil
disobedience, Rawls analyzes, breaks the law to appeal to the sense of justice of the
majority of the community.639 However, despite acting contrary to the law, fidelity
to law is expressed by the willingness of the civil disobedients to accept the legal
consequences.640 But Rawls never directly addresses the relations between civil
disobedience and the rule of law. In fact, within the theoretical tradition of the rule
of law understood as a political ideal, it is extremely hard to see how civil
disobedience or non-compliance with court injunction would be inimical to the rule
of law.
The ideal of the rule of law requires a government limited by law, procedural
justice, formal legality, and the rule of law and not men. The rule of law cannot be
harmed by disobeying some court orders. But it may not be stretching too far to argue
that a proper understanding of the rule of law requires the acceptance of punishment
and obedience of court orders by civil disobedients, as the rule of law requires
everyone to be subject to the law’s purview and authority equally.641 As Matthew
Hall contends, “[a]cceptance of punishment establishes that civil disobedience
respects the rule of law.”642 But Rawls’ discussion of civil disobedience is
contextualized in a “more or less just democratic state” wherein the citizens
_________________________
632.
RAWLS, supra note 1, at 206.
633.
Id.
634.
See id. at 207.
635.
Id. at 208.
636.
Id.
637.
Id.
638.
See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 319.
639.
Id. at 320.
640.
Id. at 322.
641.
The most plausible argument for insisting that civil disobedience must entail the acceptance of
punishment, I suggest, builds on the idea that for a legal system to exist, it possesses legal authority over everyone,
albeit not ultimate authority, which is extra-legal in nature and rests in the people. Denying punishment may erode
the legal and constitutional fabric by rejecting the legitimate authority of the legal system, and a functioning legal
system is the prerequisite and foundation of the rule of law. But even this, it does not mean rejecting punishment
and disregarding the rule of law if justice and other ideals so require must be wrong and prohibited. The value of the
rule of law is not absolute, and must be weighed against other values. See id.
642.
Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083, 2084. But even Hall acknowledges that “[t]he concept of disobedience poses no dilemma
under an illegitimate regime because no duty of obedience pertains.” Id. at 2086. In fact, “the rule of law” in his
argument seems to mean the rule of law of the community enacted and approved by the majority therein rather than
the rule of law as a political ideal. See id.
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“recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution.”643 Only under such
conditions, as Rawls himself admits, a conflict of duties would have arisen whereby
the disobedients have a duty to comply with the laws created by a legislative
majority.644
As contended in previous parts, the Hong Kong government lacks in political
legitimacy. Under such a circumstance, the civil disobedients can rightfully refuse
to accept punishment, let alone court injunctions.645 But the willing acceptance of
punishment is not identical with obeying court injunctions and orders. The HKBA
utterly missed the point on insisting that resistance to the court injunctions to leave
the protest sites would be “inimical to the Rule of Law.”646 In fact, a state court
injunction was deliberately violated by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in Alabama.647
An injunction forbade him from exercising his right of freedom of assembly, and he
was accordingly sentenced to prison for breaching the injunction.648 The Supreme
Court upheld the verdict.649 In Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience, Justice
Abe Fortas of the Supreme Court of the United States elaborates on this example,
arguing that “Dr. King, without complaint or histrionics, accepted the penalty of
misjudgement. This, I submit, is action in the great tradition of social protest in a
democratic society where all citizens, including protesters, are subject to the rule of
law.”650 This line of reasoning powerfully quashed the HKBA’s argument. Even if
the willing acceptance of punishment of civil disobedients is central to the rule of
law, they do not have to abide by certain court injunctions. Unfortunately, the
HKBA’s impoverished understanding of the rule of law degrades it to a synonym for
“obedience to law” and law and order. What is truly “alarming” is that the HKBA is
treating the rule of law as an absolute and inviolable value with overriding
supremacy. “Whenever implemented,” Tamanaha warns us, “the rule of law
(understood in terms of all three aspects) should always be subject to evaluation from
the standpoint of justice and the good of the community.”651
The rule of law in its sense of formal justice is at best a negative value. We must
bear in mind that the normativity and force of the Western idea of the rule of law are
entangled with democracy.652 The English constitutional theorist-heavyweight A.V.
Dicey ties his endorsement of the rule of law to parliamentary sovereignty, in which
the parliament is sovereign under democratic election and supervision.653 The former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of England and Wales, Tom Bingham, observes
that the normative force of the idea of the rule of law derives from a “fundamental
bargain between the individual and the state, the governed and the governor, by
_________________________
643.
RAWLS, supra note 1, at 319.
644.
See id.
645.
See ZINN, supra note 10, at 29.
646.
H.K. B. ASS’N, THE RULE OF LAW AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 582, at 3.
647.
ZINN, supra note 10, at 29.
648.
Id.
649.
Id.
650.
Id.
651.
TAMANAHA, supra note 587, at 141.
652.
See ZINN, supra note 10, at 28–29.
653.
A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 271 (1982) (“The
supremacy of the law necessitates the exercise of Parliamentary sovereignty.”).
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which both sacrifice a measure of the freedom and power which they would
otherwise enjoy.”654 Democracy is also essential to such a “bargain,” without which
judges are “mere custodians of a body of arid prescriptive rules” and not “guardians
of an all but sacred flame which animates and enlightens the society in which we
live” as they would be under a democracy.655 German philosopher Habermas’s thick
formal theory of rule of law likewise incorporates democracy into formal legality,
which is the essence of his theory of the rule of law.656 He contends that the modern
legal order can derive its legitimacy only from democracy, a decision procedure
which is substantively empty as it decides nothing regarding the content of law, but
central to the idea of self-determination under which citizens are entitled to be
authors of the law to which they are subject.657 It is fair to say that without
democracy, the rule of law is stripped of a fundamental layer of normative weight.
D. Revolutionary Disobedience: The Different Implication for the Rule of
Law
In the above parts, the potential conflict between civil disobedience and the rule
of law is accounted for. For civil disobedience, the willingness to accept punishment
in Rawls’ liberalist theory is vital not only for the rule of law but to circumscribe the
disruption within the current constitutional order.658 But revolutionary disobedience
seeks to end the authority relationship between the governors and governed, in the
process of which revolutionary disobedients are acting outside and above the
constituted order as in Schmitt’s first moment of democracy.659 As such, the
willingness to accept punishment by dissenters is not essential for revolutionary
disobedience since they are not obliged to express their fidelity to the law. In the first
place, no conflict of duty necessarily arises in the case of revolutionary disobedience
as it does with civil disobedience, where in the latter the disobedients may have an
obligation to honor their duty as the piece of majority-approved legislation that they
morally reject is socially binding upon them.660 For revolutionary disobedience, the
undemocratic or illegitimate character of the regime warrants the revolutionary
disobedients to defy the laws to suspend the legal system, either due to the
illegitimacy of the government, the state, or the constitution, or if the office of
government is acting in defiance of the terms of the social contract. Other legal
instrumentalities are exhausted, which warrants the people’s use of extra-legal means
to redeem authorship of the sovereign will. So far as the rule of law is concerned,
_________________________
654.
Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 84 (2007).
655.
Id. at 85.
656.
See JURGEN HABERMAS, BEYOND FACTS AND NORMS 449 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
657.
See id.
658.
This point could offer a rebuttal to the HKBA’s ungrounded argument that defiance of an injunction is
equivalent to taking “the law into one’s own hands, thereby going down a slippery slope towards a state of
lawlessness.” H.K. B. ASS’N, MASS DEFIANCE OF COURT ORDERS, supra note 581, at ¶ 4. An act of civil
disobedience is proceeded under the premise of preserving the constitutional fabric and juridical order and not their
demolition. Hence, the contention that defying court orders is descending into “lawlessness” or anarchism is utterly
unwarranted and far-fetched.
659.
See Hoyos, supra note 474, at 1.
660.
RAWLS, supra note 1, at 319.
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revolutionary disobedience does not come into conflict with it. Even the rule of law
is conceived in its broad sense that everyone is equally subject to the authority of the
law; revolutionary disobedience decides the exception by invoking popular
sovereignty, which is beyond the purview of the established legal system. With civil
disobedience, it recognizes the legitimacy of the government and validity of the legal
order;661 with revolutionary disobedience, it may reject the legitimacy of the
government and seek to destroy it as well as suspend the legal order. If we say that
an operative legal system is the prerequisite of the rule of law, an act of civil
disobedience is bound by the rule of law, whilst revolutionary disobedience is
immune to the rule of law as the people are acting above it and therefore unbounded
by it.
An analogy may clarify the point better. Imagine that a group of children are
playing a baseball game in an empty room and periodically cease the game to argue
about the rules (they might create new rules, debate about the interpretation of
existing rules, or oppose the application of the present rules of the umpire who they
have appointed).662 There is a difference between “playing the game” and “arguing
about the rules or composition of the game,” whereas in a political society, the
distinction is between “being subject to primary rules” and “participating in activities
that seek to change how such rules are generated (rule of recognition)663 or the
constitution of the polity.”664 The former act is subject to the rule of the game whilst
the latter is not, as it is withdrawn from the game. Civil disobedience goes along with
the former logic, as it is under the purview of the rule of law of the land, whereas
revolutionary disobedience follows the latter, which suspends the rule of law and
hence goes beyond its reach.665 But both civil disobedience and revolutionary
disobedience start off with individuals. The legal system cannot be suspended in an
instant but must be done gradually with the accumulation of individuals. But the
difference is that for revolutionary disobedience, revolutionaries do not have to
commence with the premise that they are morally required to accept punishment and
abide by the law and court orders, as the legal system has already lost its moral force
towards them. In fact, they do not have to accept punishment even though they may
be subject to it.
Returning to the HKBA’s earlier contentions on constitutional issues, again they
display the HKBA’s inadequate knowledge of world history, jurisprudence, and
constitutional theory.666 The HKBA’s allegation that “the inescapable fact is that any
discussion of electoral progress must be conducted within the framework of what is
_________________________
661.
See ZINN, supra note 10, at 39.
662.
See Hampton, supra note 574, at 28–29.
663.
The rule of recognition is the secondary rule in a legal system by which the primary rules (i.e. the laws)
come into being and be recognized. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–01 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed.
1994).
664.
Id.
665.
When the rule of law is interpreted as a political ideal, both civil and revolutionary disobedience would
not clash with it. But the rule of law broadly understood as “that people should abide by the law and be ruled by it,”
its compatibility with civil disobedience entails the willing acceptance of punishment and adherence to court orders,
which are unnecessary for revolutionary disobedience due to the fact that the rule of law is suspended in such
instance.
666.
See H.K. B. ASS’N, MASS DEFIANCE OF COURT ORDERS, supra note 581.
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constitutionally permitted” is simply untrue and misleading.667 As has been
explicated above, illegality is a key ingredient in defining the constitutional moments
and the constitution of the land, which clearly signifies a breakthrough from its
constitutional past.668 This can be discerned in the history of the founding fathers of
the U.S. who continuously disobeyed laws issued from Britain, such as tax laws on
sugar and tea due to the lack of American representatives in the British Parliament,
and, eventually, the Patriots determined to form a new state and constitution in 1776
and became independent from Britain.669 The U.S. Constitution, as explicated earlier,
was originally an “illegal convention of virtuous citizens” who spoke in the name of
the People “with an authority that had fundamental constitutional significance.”670
Also, “the Federalists asserted that an illegal convention could be a source not only
of law, but of higher law.”671 The people are the ultimate source of a constitutional
order and legal system, and thus they are to decide whether or not the order will
continue.672 People’s right to change and redefine the fundamental units—the
constitution or the rule of recognition—of the polity and to end the government exists
outside the legal system. Because the election system is part of the constitution of
the state, the people have every right to change it, be it constitutional or not. The
people’s right always exists above “what is constitutionally permitted,” which is an
extra-legal right that no one else beside the people themselves can judge and surely
not the HKBA.673 The HKBA is right to stress that not “any discussion of
constitutional or legal principles is a form of ‘trickery’ or insistence on ‘trivial
technicalities.’”674 Such discussions are of great significance. But the constitution
and legal principles must live up in accordance to the will of the people and be
subject to changes, legal or extra-legal, but they shall not take precedence over the
people’s decision. The HKBA’s firm ideological convictions on the “rule of law”
and constitutionality lack in any solid foundations, can only serve to save the
constituted order at the unbearable cost of stifling democracy and people’s right to
self-determination, disallowing any fundamental changes in cases where legal means
for changes are denied and unavailable.675 This is exactly the plight that Hong Kong
finds itself in676 and the failure of the Umbrella Movement rests precisely in the
people’s puzzlement that they must only act within the constituted order.
_________________________
667.
GUY BRESHEARS, OF PAPERS AND PROTESTS: HONG KONG RESPONDS TO OCCUPY CENTRAL 4 (2016).
668.
See discussion supra Section VII(C)(1). This does not lead to the conclusion, nevertheless, that
constitution reconstruction or the eviction of government must happen with illegality, unconstitutionality, or extralegality. If a dialogue is initiated and an agreement is reached, those changes could happen within the constituted
order in which case revolutionary disobedience would not have to be brought into being. See id.
669.
See REVOLUTIONARY FOUNDERS: REBELS, RADICALS, AND REFORMERS IN THE MAKING OF THE NATION
5–7 (Alfred F. Young et al. eds., 2011).
670.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 314, at 216.
671.
Id.
672.
See HART, supra note 663, at 60–61, 91 (discussing Hart’s contractarian thesis of the legal society); see
also Hampton, supra note 574, at 28–29.
673.
H.K. B. ASS’N, THE RULE OF LAW AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, supra note 582, at 3.
674.
Id.
675.
See id.
676.
See Buckley, Three Months of Protests End Quietly in Hong Kong, supra note 570 at 2.
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CONCLUSION
We have come to an age of forgetfulness. Living in the post-Rawlsian epoch,
some of us lose our questioning capacities towards the government, the constitution,
and the state. Under the Rawlsian liberalist formula, unjust laws are to be obeyed
given that the structure of the state is largely just, and we never come to question the
state and the unit of the people under his theory.677 We forget that the constitution
and the state are not in perpetual existence and that they could be demolished and
reconstructed, and the government which claims to represent us could be ousted from
office and its structure of institutions rebuilt. The government and the people coexist
in a fiduciary relationship, whereby the people authorize the government as their
agent to better attain their goals.678 The political authority of the government can
always be revoked by the people when it fails to live up to the people’s demand. A
government’s power needs to be justified.
Revolutionary disobedience challenges our imagination of the constitutional
order and reminds us of the danger that the government that is supposed to represent
the people might act contrary to their will and transgress its authorized limits, which
requires the direct presence of the people themselves to assert their will to reestablish the constitution and rebuild the state if they so wish. Where the government
does not wield legitimate authority, the people can eject it out of office without
further justifications, given that revolutionary disobedience is democratic and an act
of self-determination ipso facto. But even if the government possesses legitimate
authority, this merely endows it with the minimum threshold that it must pass in
order to render its employment of governmental power justifiable. Nevertheless,
when the government oversteps constitutional limits or breaks the constitutional
contract, it could lose its legitimacy. It is ultimately for the people to determine
whether the government is still fit for office, and they have the right to resist it and
oust it from office and directly author the constitution. Failure of the larger state’s
system capacity to accommodate sub-state units and preserve national culture and
distinctiveness, as well as a sub-state people being subject against their will or
suppressed by the larger state, among other things, could all justify revolutionary
disobedience where legal attempts have failed and proved to be of no avail.679 It
could take the form of direct presence by the people as popular sovereign or a substate government acting against the central government, should the latter be
authorized by the sub-state people to do so. That said, measures of revolutionary
_________________________
677.
See RAWLS, supra note 1, at 322.
678.
John Locke’s social contract theory sees the power of rulers as being entrusted by the people and only
the agent of them instead of their master. See Hampton, supra note 574, at 31. Jeremy Bentham similarly contends
that the ruler exercises “fiduciary” power solely for and on behalf of the “investing body,” which is the people. See
OREN BEN-DOR, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 60 (Hart
Publ’g, 2000. Such power must be conditioned by the constitutional limits, and the people are to judge collectively
whether such limits have been transgressed and if the social justification of the ruler’s authority expires. Id. at 110–
11.
679.
Besides the abovementioned, there are an inexhaustible number of grounds of justifications for the
recourse to revolutionary disobedience, which could be the subject of future studies and research. But the
fundamental justifications of revolutionary disobedience are democracy and self-determination, which could only
be realized through illegality and unconstitutionality when legal means fail. See discussion supra Section VII(C)(1).
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disobedience need to be proportionate to their aims and the injustice suffered,
ranging from non-violent to violent instruments, but violence could indeed be
justified.
Furthermore, the trend of democratic and nationalist movements over the past
decade has provoked us into thinking about the size and unit of the state: the
democratic boundary. Struggles for autonomy and independence from sub-state
nations such as Catalonia, Scotland, and Quebec against Spain, the United Kingdom,
and Canada, respectively,680 remind us that the state’s existence or dissolution hinges
upon its institutional capacity to express and align with the will of the people(s), be
it a nation or not. More nationalist and secessionist movements are certainly
growing.681 Continual failure of a larger state to accommodate sub-state people or a
nation casts a warning sign that warrants the claim to devolution within a unitary
state, or the structuring of a federal state or a confederation to adapt to different substate units, and even secession from the state. Not all countries are as fortunate as
Scotland, which can afford itself of a legal referendum approved by the
Westminster.682 In regions such as Catalonia, which is struggling for independence
from Spain but lacks legal means to achieve it, the supra-legal revolutionary
disobedience can always be the last resort.683 Confronted with a political deadlock,
sub-state units, such as Hong Kong and Macau under China, can also initiate
revolutionary disobedience to realize their own constitutional creation.684 The
current or established state structures are not given but are originated from villages,
tribes, and communities. If the predominant nation-states or multinational states fail
to institutionally and democratically accommodate smaller units of people, we may
want to return to the small city-states which Rousseau stresses are of optimal size for
a self-governing polity.
I would like to end this Article by discussing Hannah Arendt. In Eichmann in
Jerusalem, Arendt accuses Eichmann, the organizer of the Holocaust, as practicing
“the banality of evil.”685 To Arendt, Eichmann is not stupid but “thoughtless.”686 In
refusing to think, to deliberate, or to engage in an internal dialogue with oneself but
to partake in such atrocity, a person refuses to be a human being with conscience.687
When a government refuses to engage in a genuine dialogue with the people, to
_________________________
680.
NATHALIE DUCLOS, The Strange Case of the Scottish Independence Referendum: Some Elements of
Comparison Between the Scottish and Catalan Cases, FRENCH JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIES (2014).
681.
For instance, Greenland is seeking independence from Denmark and Somaliland questing for
international recognition as an independent state from Somalia. See Greenland Is Getting Ready to Stand Alone,
GUARDIAN
(June
15,
2010,
4:00
EDT),
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/15/independent-greenland-mineral-resources-denmark.
682.
Scottish Independence, Nicola Sturgeon to Seek Second Referendum, BBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-39255181.
683.
Catalonia’s Push for Independence from Spain, BBC NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29478415.
684.
See Showdown Looms in Hong Kong as Civil Disobedience Meets Tear Gas, THE INDIAN EXPRESS (Sept.
29, 2014), http://indianexpress.com/article/world/asia/showdown-looms-in-hong-kong-as-civil-disobediencemeets-tear-gas/.
685.
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rectify its wrongs, and to admit that its power derives from the people who can forfeit
it, the people have no other options but coercion. This is where revolutionary
disobedience comes into place. It is a distinctive form of political disobedience,
which is different from civil disobedience in profound manners. Whilst both can lead
to a change of “the authoritative,” or the constitution, considering Ackerman’s
powerful argument that Dr. King’s civil disobedience movement has led to changes
in the constitution, the latter is achieved by the government re-presenting the
people’s will whereas, in the former, the people directly author such changes as the
popular sovereign, and only an act of revolutionary disobedience denies the authority
of the constituted power and seeks to destroy it.688 Unlike in civil disobedience,
where the authority relationship still exists between the constituent power and
constituted power, in the case of revolutionary disobedience, it completely breaks
down. In such a case, the office of government is forced into a dialogue with the
people and must make concessions. If suppression and denial ensue persistently,
revolutionary disobedience would necessarily turn to violence when the resort to
rationality and conversation fails. The constituent power would bring about a new
“in authority,” a re-creation of the authority relationship and possibly a new
constitutional order.

_________________________
688.

See ACKERMAN, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, supra note 41, at 3123, 3128.
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